India Persecution Tracker | 2024 | Overview

Overview of human rights abuses and violations against India’s religious minorities from 1 January to 31 December, 2024.

Key Figures (2024)
STATE ACTORS
  • 46 extrajudicial killings of minorities by state actors. (21 Muslim, 12 Adivasi, 12 Kuki-Zo, 1 Sikh)
  • 21 Muslims killed by police forces. (1 extrajudicial ‘encounter’, 3 other custodial deaths, 11 shot dead in the context of protests, and 6 killed by state actors in other contexts) (In 2023, we recorded 20 Muslims killed by police)
  • 12 Adivasi (Chhattisgarh) and 10 Kuki-Zo minority (Manipur) civilians shot dead by security forces.
  • 61+ Muslims subjected to custodial torture and ill-treatment. (56+ grievously injured by UP Police in staged ‘half-encounter’ shootings.) 
  • 600% increase in incidence of election hate speeches by senior elected politicians during 2024 GE, compared to 2019. (61 speeches by PM Modi)
NON-STATE ACTORS
  • 17 killed in suspected hate crime attacks by Hindu extremists. (14 Muslim men, and 1 woman and her child, an Adivasi Christian woman, and a Hindu man)
  • 59 ‘communal riots’ across India. (32 were reported in 2023) 
  • 4 waves of attacks on Muslims across multiple states: January (Ram Temple consecration), June (aftermath of elections, and Bakra Eid), August (reports of anti-Hindu violence in Bangladesh), September-October (Hindu festive season). 14 anti-Muslim incitement & violence hotspots: Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, Rajasthan, Telangana, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand (11 governed by BJP). 197+ Muslims gravely assaulted by Hindu extremists in other contexts. 75% of cases in BJP-ruled states.

2024 reinforced the past trend of the lives of India’s religious minorities, particularly Muslims and Christians, becoming more precarious, whilst journalists, HRDs and dissenters overall, faced the iron hand of the state. Despite significant electoral setbacks faced by the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the General Election (GE) to India’s Parliament (conducted between April and June), previously reported trends in the persecution of minorities continued largely unabated and, in some cases, hardened. Anti-minority hate rhetoric saw an unprecedented spike, particularly during the GE period, with senior state officials normalising the use of dehumanising rhetoric against minorities that incited hostility and discrimination towards them. This provided the backdrop for the return of the BJP-led government to power for the third consecutive time, and for the continuation of grave anti-minority abuses and the curtailment of basic freedoms, along with the perpetuation of systemic discrimination. An observer described the prevailing situation as ‘the new normal’. 

In this annual edition of the India Persecution Tracker, we provide an overview of these trends for the year 2024, based on compilations from our previously published quarterly reports. Below are some of the highlights of the year gone by: 

  • Grave abuses reported from across the country included extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture and ill-treatment, and the advocacy of religious hatred amounting to incitement to violence. Provinces ruled or controlled by BJP-led governments – such as Uttar Pradesh, Assam, Uttarakhand, and Manipur – witnessed the most serious abuses by state actors. Across these regions, authorities also resorted to various reprisals as collective punishment, against minorities and dissenters, on various pretexts. In 2024, we documented: 46 episodes of extrajudicial killings (21 Muslim, 12 Kuki-Zo, 12 Adivasi) by state actors, all in BJP-governed states; 62 instances of custodial torture and ill-treatment (including 55 instances of Muslims being maimed in staged shootouts); and thousands of arbitrary arrests and detentions, including of Rohingya refugees who fled Myanmar to India.
  • At the same time, BJP-allied Hindu extremist actors like the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and Bajrang Dal (BD) continued to enjoy a free rein, across the country and particularly in BJP-governed provinces. Members of these outfits continued to harass, intimidate, assault and murder religious minorities, particularly Muslims, on various pretexts. A civil society tracking initiative documented 59 ‘communal riots’ across the country in 2024, compared to 32 in 2023. Four waves of near-simultaneous, multi-state mass violence episodes were reported, all targeted at Muslims. Hindu extremists also murdered at least 17 individuals (15 Muslims, 1 Christian, 1 Hindu) in suspected hate crimes, with 11 of these being reported within a month of the conclusion of General Election 2024. At least 14 of India’s 28 states (11 governed by the BJP) were hotbeds of anti-minority incitement and violence throughout the year – Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, Rajasthan, Telangana, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand.
  • Fuelling these abuses was the continued proliferation of hateful, anti-minority rhetoric by senior BJP leaders and state officials, led by PM Modi, who referred to India’s Muslims as ‘infiltrators’ and other pejoratives, on multiple occasions during the General Election as well as during subsequent state-level elections. Other senior leaders of the BJP as well as powerful Hindu religious figures continued to make open calls to expel, boycott, assault and kill Muslims. BJP allies VHP and BD, and other similar groups, kept the communal pot boiling further at the local level by organising hundreds of anti-minority hate congregations across the country, and dozens of events where participants were distributed weapons and trained in their use. Throughout the year, anti-minority hate and misinformation also continued to flood India’s television networks and social media spaces.
  • At both national and provincial levels, BJP-led governments continued to embrace authoritarian governance methods and continued to adopt discriminatory policies and practices, despite its diminished position in the national Parliament. Manifestations of minority faiths, particularly Islam, were systematically targeted, paving the way for further attacks by Hindu extremist non-state actors. BJP-led governments also targeted minority residences, livelihoods, and education, as part of collective punishment measures, further deepening the socio-economic marginalisation and exclusion they have historically faced.
  • India’s domestic mechanisms continued largely to fail to ensure effective remedy and accountability for serious ongoing and past violations, with the judicial process remaining skewed towards powerful Hindu nationalist interests, and against minorities.

Throughout the year, international actors, including UN bodies and experts, continued to raise alarm about the deteriorating situation in India:

  • The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights registered his concerns over ‘increasing restrictions on the civic space – with human rights defenders, journalists and critics targeted – as well as by hate speech and discrimination against minorities, especially Muslims.’
  • The UN Human Rights Committee, after its periodic review of India’s compliance with the International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights (ICCPR)—conducted following a gap of 28 years—issued a strong set of recommendations relating to, inter alia, violence against religious minorities, gender-based violence, the use of counter-terror and other national security laws to suppress dissent, and high levels of corruption. 
  • The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) issued a statement under its early warning and urgent action procedure, about the sustained hate rhetoric faced by Rohingya refugees who have fled Myanmar to India, as well as reports of their arbitrary mass detention and forced deportation.
  • The European Parliament adopted a resolution expressing concern about ‘acts of violence, increasing nationalistic rhetoric and divisive policies’ in India. 
  • The United States (US) State Department, in its annual Human Rights Report for 2023, flagged reports of more than a dozen different kinds of abuses in India, including ‘crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting members of ethnic and caste minorities’, among others. The US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) recommended, once again, that India be designated as a Country of Special Concern. The Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission conducted a Congressional hearing to discuss continuing attacks on India’s minorities and the general erosion of human rights.
  • CIVICUS rated civic space in India as ‘repressed’, and published a report highlighting the deterioration of fundamental freedoms during PM Modi’s second term. India’s score in Reporters Without Borders’ (RSF) World Press Freedom Index fell from 36.62 to 31.28, now ranked 159 among 180 jurisdictions. Freedom House, in its Freedom in the World 2024 report, retained India’s score at 66/100 and graded it as ‘Partly Free’. The V-Dem Institute, in its Democracy Report 2024, continued to classify India as an ‘electoral autocracy’, and noted that it was ‘one of the worst autocratisers’ in the world over the past decade.

       

In 2024, police forces in UP shot and killed a Muslim man as part of the state’s ‘thok do’ (knock down) policy purportedly to curb crime, in an allegedly staged ‘encounter’ shooting. Security forces operating in Chhattisgarh and Manipur, were accused of a total of 22 extrajudicial killings in similarly staged settings. 14 individuals across four states were reportedly killed as a result of the use of excessive force by police forces during protests, and 6 more individuals were killed as a result of the violent actions of state actors in other contexts.

In 2023, we had documented a total of 20 extrajudicial killings of Muslims by state actors. 

In 2024, at least 23 individuals were shot at and killed by security forces in allegedly staged settings: 

  • On 16 January, police forces in Muzaffarnagar in BJP-governed Uttar Pradesh shot and killed a 23-year-old Muslim man in an allegedly staged ‘encounter’. Police claimed that the victim was a car thief, and that he was killed in a shoot-out while trying to evade custody. The victim’s family denied the allegation and claimed the killing was staged. 

    Police forces in UP have shot and killed over 207 individuals – disproportionately Muslims – in such alleged staged ‘encounters’ since March 2017, when the BJP’s Yogi Adityanath assumed charge as the state’s Chief Minister, as part of his thok do (knock down) policy purportedly to curb crime. SAJC had documented 5 such killings of Muslims in 2023.

    In 2024, UP police forces also shot at and grievously injured at least 55 Muslims in staged shootings, known as ‘half encounters’ in local parlance. (See section on Torture.)

  • On 10 May, 12 Adivasis were shot and killed in Bijapur in BJP-governed Chhattisgarh, in what police claimed was a security forces operation against left-wing extremists. Locals alleged those killed were innocent tribals who had been picked up from two villages, branded militants, and subsequently executed.

    Chhattisgarh is one of several provinces where non-international armed conflict has been raging between government forces and left-wing militants. Violence has spiked since late-2023, when BJP assumed power in the state. As of May 2024, official figures had put the number of alleged militants killed at 104, up from 30 for the whole of 2023. Civil society groups have alleged that more than 50 of those killed were unarmed tribal villagers.

  • On 11 November, 10 members of the Kuki-Zo tribal community, including a minor, were shot and killed by security forces in Jiribam in BJP-governed Manipur. While security forces alleged that those killed were militants, local Kukis claimed that the victims were ‘village volunteers’, a term used for armed civilians guarding villages amid inter-ethnic violence. Post-mortem reports appeared to show that most of the victims were shot from behind, and that at least four had their eyes missing, suggesting torture.

    Over 200 killings and widespread sexual violence, among other grave abuses, have been reported from Manipur since inter-ethnic violence broke out in the state in May, 2023.

In 2024, at least 3 Muslims died as a result of alleged custodial torture and physical ill-treatment by police:

  • On 5 June,  a 38-year-old Muslim man died in police custody in Pulwama, Kashmir, allegedly as a result of torture. The victim’s family alleged that the victim’s body bore signs of torture, and that the police threatened them with posthumous framing of the victim on militancy or drug-related charges.

  • On 24 August, a 24-year-old Muslim man died in police custody in Nagaon, Assam. Police claimed the man ‘slipped and fell’ into a pond and drowned while attempting to escape as he was being taken to the crime scene for investigation. The victim had earlier been arrested and accused in a case relating to the gangrape of a 14-year-old girl.

  • On 28 August, a 24-year-old Muslim man in Haridwar, Uttarakhand, died after he was reportedly flung into a pond by members of the state police’s official cattle protection squad. Police claimed that the six-member police squad was patrolling the area in search of cattle smugglers, and that the victim had jumped into the pond while trying to evade them. The victim’s family alleged that he had been apprehended and assaulted by six police officials before being flung into the pond. They further alleged that the victim’s legs were found tied, and that there were injury marks on his face.

In 2024, eleven Muslims across two states were shot dead by police forces amid mass protests:

  • On 8 February, at least six Muslim civilians in Haldwani in BJP-governed Uttarakhand were shot dead by police whilst they were protesting against local authorities’ demolition of a mosque and adjacent seminary. The killings occurred shortly after the state Chief Minister convened a high-level meeting of senior police officials where he was reported to have issued ‘shoot on sight’ orders.
  • On 24 November, five Muslim civilians in Sambhal in BJP-governed UP were shot dead by police whilst they were protesting local authorities’ attempts to survey a historical mosque. Videos showed police officials firing live bullets at protestors, while also pelting stones at them. Later, families of the victims alleged that they faced threats and coercion to give false statements exonerating the police. The police also allegedly forced families to bury their dead quickly and without following proper religious rites. 

The aftermath of the killings in both locations was marked by police crackdowns in Muslim-concentration neighbourhoods, with reports of mass arrests/detentions, threats and intimidation, and arbitrary confiscation of property. 

Other instances of minorities being shot dead in the context of protests included:

  • On 14 February, at least one person was killed, and dozens injured, after police forces in Shambhu in BJP-governed Haryana resorted to excessive use of force against Sikh farmer-protesters demanding a minimum legal guarantee for crop prices. The protesters were reportedly targeted using lathis (sticks), tear gas (allegedly delivered through drones, in the first such reported instance in the country), and proscribed pellet-firing shotguns similar to those that had previously been used only in Indian-administered Kashmir.
  • On 16 February, two Kuki-Zo protesters were killed and around 25 injured in Churachandpur in BJP-governed Manipur, after police forces opened fire at a crowd that had gathered outside the offices of the district police chief.  Police claimed that they initially used tear gas to disperse the mob and subsequently used live ammunition as a last resort.

The deaths of at least six other Muslims were attributable to the violent actions of state actors:

  • On 22 June, two unarmed Muslim men in Nagaon, Assam, were shot dead in a wildlife sanctuary by state forest guards who reportedly suspected them of being poachers. The victims, who were brothers, received bullet injuries to the chest. The state Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma, who ordered a probe into the incident, claimed that the victims were ‘trespassers’ who were shot in self-defence’.
  • On 27 August, a 55-year-old Muslim woman in Bijnor, UP, died amidst a raid being conducted at her residence by police officials. Police had reportedly received a tip-off that beef was being stored in the premises. The victim’s family alleged that police barged into their home, ransacked the household, and misbehaved with the residents, leading her to have a ‘panic attack’ that resulted in her death.
  • On 12 September, two 18-year-old Bengali-speaking Muslims were shot dead by police during a forced eviction drive in Kachutali village, Assam. Police claimed that the eviction—apparently to clear encroachments from land designated for tribals—had prompted violent resistance from the area’s residents, who allegedly ignored the police’s initial warning shots. Amid the clearance operations, locals criticised the selective targeting of Bengali Muslim families, alleging that around 60 Muslim families were evicted while non-Muslim residents were left undisturbed. By the end of the week, more than 140 homes had reportedly been demolished as part of the eviction drive. 
  • On 6 October, a Muslim man was killed in police firing amid violent communal clashes in Kadamtala area in North Tripura district, Tripura. Police was reported to have intervened with baton charges and, subsequently, opened fire to restore order. The victim was shot in the head during the firing. Tripura was one of 12 provinces that witnessed communal violence in 2024. (See section on Torture – Non-State Actors.)

In 2024, Hindu extremist groups with close links to the BJP continued to unleash violence against Muslims and other minorities, often resulting in death. We documented 17 deaths (15 Muslims including a woman and her 3-year-old child, an Adivasi Christian woman, and a Hindu youth) in suspected religiously-motivated hate crimes. 11 of these killings were reported within a month of the conclusion of the 2024 General Election. Of these, six killings were by alleged cow ‘vigilantes’ purporting to work for the protection of cows. 

Chhattisgarh (4) and Jharkhand (3) reported the highest number of deaths. 

In 2023, we had documented 25 such deaths, all of Muslims, in suspected religiously-motivated hate crimes. 

The victims included:

  • 22 May, 2024 (Diyodar, Gujarat): A Muslim truck driver who was lynched to death by Hindu extremists, reportedly after he was accosted while transporting cattle. Among those accused in the case was a man who had reportedly previously been involved in another violent assault of a Muslim man in 2023. 
  • 7 June, 2024 (Raipur, Chhattisgarh): Three Muslim men who were accosted and lynched by Hindu extremists while transporting buffaloes from Uttar Pradesh to Odisha. Later, local Hindu extremists, including a BJP MLA, reportedly led mass protests demanding the release of the men arrested in connection with the lynching. 
  • 18 June, 2024 (Aligarh, Uttar Pradesh): A 35-year-old Muslim man who was lynched by a Hindu mob that reportedly suspected him of theft. A civil society fact-finding report alleged attempts by local authorities to protest the accused. 
  • 22 June, 2024 (Anand, Gujarat): A 23-year-old Muslim man who was lynched by a mob at a cricket tournament. 
  • 24 June, 2024 (Dantewada, Chhattisgarh): An Adivasi Christian woman who was murdered by her relatives who reportedly disputed her claim to family land following her conversion to Christianity.
  • 26 June, 2024 (Kolkata, WB): A Muslim man who was tied up and lynched by a mob that accused him of theft. 
  • 2 July, 2024 (Koderma, Jharkhand): A Muslim cleric who was lynched by a mob, reportedly after his bike collided with a woman and caused her minor injuries.
  • 4 July, 2024 (Shamli, UP): A Muslim man who was beaten to death by a mob that reportedly accused him of theft.
  • 7 July, 2024 (Ranchi, Jharkhand): A 30-year-old Muslim man who was lynched by a mob that reportedly accused him of stealing a goat.
  • 30 July, 2024 (Pakur, Jharkhand): A 22-year-old Muslim man who was beaten to death by a mob that accused him of theft. 
  • 27 August, 2024 (Charkhi Dadri, Haryana): A Bengali Muslim migrant worker who was lynched by a Hindu mob that accused him of cooking and consuming beef.
  • 29 September, 2024 (Latur, Maharashtra): A Muslim woman and her three-year-old daughter who were killed after suspected Hindu extremists ran over the motorcycle on which they were travelling. While police claimed that the killings were the result of a road rage incident and not a hate crime, the woman’s husband—a co-passenger, along with their six-year-old son, both of whom survived with injuries—alleged that the assailants had chased the family, used religious slurs and stated that ‘Muslims need to be taught a lesson’, before mowing them down.
  • 30 December, 2024 (Moradabad, UP): A 37-year-old Muslim man was lynched to death by a mob that accused him on being involved in cow slaughter. A purported video of the murder was circulated online.

Also killed by suspected Hindu extremists was a 17-year-old Hindu boy, on 3 September in Faridabad, Haryana. The victim was reportedly mistaken by the assailants for a Muslim cattle smuggler. One of the attackers was later reported to have expressed remorse for ‘killing a Brahmin’.

In 2024, we documented reports of over 62 Muslims being subject to custodial torture and other forms of physical ill-treatment by police and other security forces. Of these, 56 were victims of allegedly staged ‘half-encounter’ shootings by state police in Uttar Pradesh. 

(The numbers cited above do not include reported instances of custodial death or deaths reportedly caused as a result of use of excessive force against protesters. For those, see section on Deprivation of Life.)

In 2024, we documented reports of at least 56 Muslims (and 2 Hindus) being shot at and grievously injured by police forces in Uttar Pradesh, sustaining bullet injuries in the knees and leg before being formally arrested by police officials in the presence of media. 53 of the injured Muslims were accused by police of being involved in cattle smuggling, while two were accused of involvement in the murder of a Hindu man amid communal violence. 

The bulk of these shootings were reported from western UP, with Muzaffarnagar (15), Rampur (10), Meerut (6),  Shamli (5), and Saharanpur (4) accounting for the highest number of injuries. 

Such shootings, known as ‘half encounters’ in local parlance (when ‘encounters’ do not cause death), have skyrocketed in 2024 – we documented two such shootings of alleged Muslim cattle smugglers in 2023. It is widely alleged that many, if not most, such shootings are staged by police, usually against individuals already in their custody.

The numbers cited above are likely to be significant undercounts – government data has revealed that since 2017, when the BJP’s Yogi Adityanath assumed charge as the state’s Chief Minister, state police forces have shot at and killed over 207 individuals in ‘encounters’ and injured over 5000 others in ‘half encounters’. Muslims accounted for over 32 per cent (67) of the ‘encounter’ victims, despite forming only around 19 per cent of the state population.

Adityanath has championed such police excesses as part of his ‘thok do’ (knock down) policy, purportedly to curb crime. Media reports suggested that these ‘half encounters’ are privately referred to as ‘Operation Langda (Lame)’ by state police. 

Other reported cases of custodial torture of Muslims in 2024 included the following:

  • 3 January, 2024 (Ranchi, Jharkhand): A 12-year-old Muslim boy was reportedly assaulted and subject to religious abuse by police officers inside a police station.
  • 5 January, 2024 (Budaun, UP): A 22-year-old Muslim youth (Rehan Shah) was reportedly tortured in custody by police, after he was detained for questioning in a cow slaughter case. The family of the victim alleged that he was beaten, given electric shocks, and sodomised with a plastic pipe, resulting in serious injuries. Following a complaint from the victim’s mother, five policemen were reportedly booked for criminal intimidation, causing non-fatal injury, and other provisions. No arrests had been reported. 
  • 8 March, 2024 (New Delhi): In a video that went viral on social media, a Delhi Police official was seen repeatedly kicking Muslim worshippers who were offering public prayers by the side of a road near the local mosque. The policeman was suspended from service, and a departmental inquiry initiated against him.  
  • 20 November, 2024 (Kwath village, Jammu & Kashmir): Four Muslim were reportedly subject to custodial torture by soldiers of the Indian Army, shortly after a militant attack nearby. Locals told reporters that four Muslim men—all labourers and farmers—were called to the army camp, where they were blamed for ‘not informing’ the army about militant activity in the area, and ‘ruthlessly beaten’ for hours. While the army claimed to have launched an investigation into the incident, police have reportedly not filed a criminal case, as no formal complaint was received from the victims. The incident is part of a broader pattern of human rights abuses by Indian security forces operating in J&K – in a similar incident in December 2023, three Muslim civilians in Kashmir were reportedly killed and at least 22 more across five villages were severely tortured, in what appeared to be a coordinated army operation. The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA), active in the region, provides legal protection to the army from prosecution in civilian courts.

The cases highlighted above are emblematic, with custodial torture remaining an endemic feature of policing in India. The victims of such abuses rarely speak out or seek accountability, fearing reprisal. Even when they do, their accounts are often not covered by the media. In 2024, we had also separately documented 300+ instances of Muslims being arbitrarily arrested or detained by police – it is highly likely that many of these cases also involved custodial torture and ill-treatment. (See section on Arrests & Detention.)

In 2024, Hindu extremist actors, including some with close ties to the BJP, continued their targeting of minorities, particularly Muslims, through religiously-motivated mass violence, resulting in hundreds of injuries. A tracking initiative by Centre for the Study of Society and Secularism (CSSS) documented 59 ‘communal riots’ through the year, up from 32 in 2023. (Scholars and analysts have concluded that what are often mischaracterised as ‘riots’ in India are in fact episodes of organised, targeted mass violence against minorities.)

Major spikes in reported episodes of targeted anti-Muslim violence in 2024 included:

  1. Ram Temple Consecration (21-24 January, 2024): Hindu nationalists’ celebrations in the lead-up to and after the inauguration of the Ram Temple at the site of the historical, illegally destroyed Babri Masjid (mosque) in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh, provided the context for targeted, anti-Muslim violence in at least eight states – Bihar, Delhi, Gujarat, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Telangana, Uttar Pradesh. Instances of Dalits and Christians being targeted too were reported.
  • Basant Panchami (14 February, 2024): Religiously-motivated mass violence was reported from multiple locations in Bihar amid the Hindu festival of Basant Panchami, resulting in at least 40 injures.
  • Holi (25 March, 2024): Amid Holi festivities, instances of Hindu revellers harassing and assaulting Muslims were reported from Gujarat, Jharkhand, and Uttar Pradesh.
  • Ram Navami (17 April, 2024): Unlike in previous years, when Ram Navami festivities provided the pretext for targeted anti-Muslim violence in over half a dozen states, violence was reportedly limited to West Bengal in 2024, resulting in around 20 injuries. This reduction in violence is notable, and perhaps attributable to the festival occurring during the 2024 General Election period, when security forces were on heightened alert across the country.
  • Bakra Eid (15-18 June): The Muslim festival of Bakra Eid provided the pretext for Hindu extremists claiming to be opposed to animal slaughter to violently target Muslims en masse in at least three states – Himachal Pradesh, Odisha, Telangana.
  • Reports of anti-Hindu violence in Bangladesh (8-16 August, 2024): Reports of violence against Hindus in Bangladesh, in the aftermath of the student protests that had culminated in the resignation of that nation’s Prime Minister in early-August, resulted in ‘retaliatory’ violence against India’s Muslims in at least five states – Assam, Delhi, Maharashtra, Odisha, Uttar Pradesh.

Broadly, the violence and authorities’ response followed the same template seen in recent years: Hindu extremists, usually linked to BJP-allied Hindu nationalist groupings such as the Bajrang Dal (BD), used shobha yatras (religious ‘glory’ processions) as a pretext to shout offensive slogans – often including direct incitement to violence – at Muslim-concentration localities, sparking communal clashes. Authorities, particularly in BJP-governed states, unfairly and disproportionately targeted Muslims, portraying them as the perpetrators, and subjecting them to collective punishment in the form of mass arrests and arbitrary demolition of Muslim-owned homes and businesses. Hindu extremist perpetrators of violence, meanwhile, largely enjoyed impunity.

  • At least 111 Muslims assaulted by Hindu extremist cow vigilantes across 11 states: Emboldened by cow protection laws that are now in place in 20 of India’s provinces, Hindu extremists purporting to work for the welfare of cows continued to harass and unleash violence against Muslims across the country. In 2024, we documented reports of at least 111 Muslims being injured in such violent attacks. (In 2023, we had documented 52 such injuries.) The highest number of injuries were reported from Rajasthan (33), Uttar Pradesh (24), Haryana (19), and Madhya Pradesh (16), all of which were governed by the BJP and its allies at the time of the assaults. In Uttar Pradesh, this escalation in violent assaults by cow vigilantes was accompanied by a significant increase in staged ‘half-encounter’ shootings of alleged cattle smugglers by police forces.

  • At least 12 Muslims assaulted by Hindu extremists for being in inter-religious relationships: In 2024, at least 12 Muslim men were assaulted by Hindu extremists who accused them of being in inter-religious relationships (and in some cases, for merely being friends) with Hindu women and girls. Karnataka, a non-BJP governed state, accounted for 9 such assaults. (In 2023, we had documented 16 such assaults.)

  • At least 74 Muslims assaulted by Hindu extremists in other contexts: In 2024, at least 74 Muslims were injured in violent attacks by Hindu extremists in other pretexts. Among the victims were three Muslim children (aged 6, 9 and 11) who were attacked in Ratlam (MP), an elderly Muslim man who was attacked for begging in a Hindu-concentration neighbourhood in Amethi (UP), and an elderly Muslim who was attacked after falsely being accused of carrying beef aboard a train near Mumbai (Maharashtra). Three BJP-governed states – Uttar Pradesh (20), Assam (14) and Maharashtra (14) – accounted for the highest number of injuries. In Assam, each of the reported assaults was against Muslim members of the Bengali-speaking linguistic minority.

United Christian Forum, an advocacy group, documented 673 attacks against Christians in 2024 (up to end-October), with the highest number of incidents reported from Uttar Pradesh and Chhattisgarh.

UCF defines attack as instances of physical violence, killings, sexual harassment, threats, social exclusion, and vandalism. UCF also noted that police authorities registered formal cases (known as First Information Reports, or FIRs) in only 47 of these instances.

UCF documented around 750 attacks against Christians in 2023.

In 2024, authorities across the country continued to arbitrarily arrest or detain minorities on various spurious charges. Key trends that emerged or continued during the year included:

Police forces in BJP-governed states across the country continued to arrest mostly-working class Muslims en masse as collective punishment in the immediate aftermath of episodes of mass violence initiated by Hindu extremist groups. Key episodes included:

  • January 2024: Dozens of Muslims and other BJP-critics were reportedly arrested across the country on and following the day of the consecration of the newly-constructed Ram Temple in Ayodhya. Locations from where mass arrests were reported included Sangareddy (Telangana), Mehsana (Gujarat), and Mumbai (Maharashtra), among others.
  • February 2024: Over 100 Muslims were reportedly arrested in connection with the protests in Haldwani, Uttarakhand, over the demolition of a mosque by local authorities, when five Muslims were shot dead by police. (also see section on Deprivation of Life.) A week after the violence, authorities were also reported to have begun proceedings to confiscating the properties of at least nine of the arrested Muslims.  Many of those arrested were charged under the draconian anti-terror Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA).
  • April 2024: At least 15 Kashmiri Muslim men were arrested under preventive detention provisions of the J&K Public Safety Act (PSA), in three separate batches, in Jammu & Kashmir.
  • September 2024: Over 28 Muslims, including 9 women, were detained and taken to a ‘transit camp’, shortly after they were declared by a Foreigners Tribunal in Assam.
  • September – October, 2024: Amid the spike in anti-Muslim violence during the Hindu festive season (see section on Torture), over 200 Muslims across the country were reportedly arrested or detained, selectively, in the aftermath of sectarian clashes. Dozens of Muslims, including a prominent lawyer and an activist, were also reportedly arrested in the aftermath of the police firing in Sambhal in November that had resulted in 5 deaths. Muslims arrested in other contexts included at least two journalists (in Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh).

Similar mass arrests almost exclusively of Muslims had been reported in 2023 as well – in Nuh (Haryana), as well as in the aftermath of violence during the Ram Navami festival. Other notable arrests of Muslims in 2024 included that of Kashmiri journalist Aasif Sultan, who was re-arrested yet again in February and has been incarcerated since 2018, and Mufti Salman Azhari, a popular Islamic scholar in Gujarat, who was first arrested on 5 February and later re-arrested a few days later. Sultan’s latest arrest is under the anti-terror UAPA, while Azhari was held under Gujarat’s Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act (PASA), which provides for preventive detention without trial for up to a year. Azhari was released following a Supreme Court order in October, while Sultan remains incarcerated at the time of writing.

India’s provincial-level anti-conversion statutes – now in place in 12 states – continued to be weaponised against Christian faith leaders as well as Muslim men accused of being in inter-religious relationships with Hindu women. In 2024, we documented reports of over 130 Christians being arrested, with Uttar Pradesh (79) accounting for the highest number of arrests. In September, UP had enacted changes to its anti-conversion law, strengthening penalties and enabling unconnected individuals to file complaints. Data released in 2023 had revealed that 855 had been made under the law since 2020, mostly against Muslims.

Throughout the year, authorities across the country continued to detain Rohingya Muslim refugees from Myanmar, accusing them of staying in the country illegally.

The UNHCR estimates that there are over 40,000 Rohingya refugees in India, of whom 676 are in detention. 608 have ‘no ongoing court cases or sentences pending’ against them. Around half of all Rohingya detainees in the country are women and children. Since 2021, India has reportedly forcibly deported at least 38 Rohingya refugees to Myanmar.

In September, over 100 Rohingya lodged in a detention centre in Assam undertook a hunger strike over their prolonged incarceration. A civil society report published in December highlighted the decrepit conditions in detention centres, as well as violations of constitutional and human rights.

Throughout the year, senior BJP leaders and other Hindu extremists also continued to label the Rohingya as terrorists and criminals, and called for their mass deportation. Hate rhetoric against the Rohingya was rife most recently during state-level elections in October-November, when Muslim migrants to central Indian states were deemed Bangladeshi and Rohingya ‘infiltrators’. Such hate rhetoric has also remained sustained in Assam, led by Chief Minister Himanta Sarma, and in Delhi, where legislative elections are due by February 2025.

In July, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) issued a statement under its early warning and urgent action procedure, expressing alarm over widespread racist hate speech against Rohingya refugees in India, as well as reports of their arbitrary mass detention and forcible deportation.

India witnessed escalated religious polarisation and anti-Muslim mobilisation throughout the year, particularly during the 2024 General Election (April-June), as well as ahead of crucial state-level elections in October-November. (As detailed in previous sections (see Torture), this resulted in physical violence on multiple occasions.)

India’s General Election provided the pretext for a spike in religious polarisation and anti-minority hate speech, including incitement to discrimination, hostility, and violence. The BJP’s election campaign centred around sectarian rhetoric, seemingly intended to dehumanise Muslims and manufacture fear among India’s Muslim majority.

During the election period (from notification of elections on 16 March to the end of campaigning on 29 May), we documented a total of 380 ‘top’ and ‘intermediate’ level hate speeches, a 600 per cent increase from the 2019 GE period, when we had documented a 40 hate speeches. (According to the United Nations’ Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech, ‘top level’ hate speech refers to advocacy of discriminatory hatred constituting incitement to hostility, discrimination, or violence, and incitement to genocide, all of which are prohibited under international law. ‘Intermediate’ level hate speech refers to speech which may be prohibited by states – and are prohibited by India – to protect the rights or reputations of others, or for the protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or morals.)

Senior BJP leaders accounted for 287 (76%) of the documented hate speeches. Leading the charge was Prime Minister Narendra Modi (60 speeches), who, at an election rally in Banswara (Rajasthan), was reported referring to India’s Muslims as ‘infiltrators’ and ‘those with more children’, and accusing the opposition Congress Party of conspiring to snatch wealth from Hindus and redistribute it to Muslims. Different versions of this narrative–of the opposition conspiring on behalf of Muslims–continued to be parroted throughout the election, including by PM Modi himself, as well as other senior BJP leaders, including India’s Home Minister (43 speeches), Defence Minister, Sports Minister, and the Chief Ministers of Uttar Pradesh (73 speeches) and Assam (22 speeches).

India’s election authorities failed to take decisive action, issuing only broad directives to party chiefs (including of opposition parties) instead of using their plenary powers to act against individual violators of election laws and codes of conduct.

In September, UN Special Procedures mandate-holders on minority rights, freedom of religion or belief, and freedom of expression, found that election-time speeches by PM Modi and other senior BJP leaders appear to prima facie fulfil the components of religious hatred that constitute internationally prohibited hate speech (incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence).

(See our India Hate Speech Monitor for more detailed coverage of anti-Muslim hate speech during the 2024 General Election.)

The lack of accountability from India’s public authorities during the 2024 General Election appeared to incentivise the normalisation of the use of sectarian anti-Muslim rhetoric during subsequent elections.

During a series of state-level elections in key states (and parliamentary by-elections, among others) beginning in October, the BJP’s electioneering once again seemed to be centred around dehumanising Muslims and manufacturing fear among India’s Hindu majority. Unfounded and discredited anti-Muslim conspiracy theories such as ‘love jihad’ and ‘land jihad’ continued to be recurring themes in campaign speeches, as was the use of pejoratives like ‘infiltrators’ with reference to Muslims. In Jharkhand, an eastern state with a significant tribal population, the BJP attempted to pit members of indigenous tribes against Muslims, including via a television ad.

As during the General Election, the narrative was led by the BJP’s senior leadership, including Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Home Minister Amit Shah (both of whom again referred to Muslims as ‘infiltrators’ on multiple occasions, and falsely accused opposition parties of conspiring to ‘steal’ reservation benefits from Dalits and Adivasis to redistribute those to Muslims), Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath (who, in at least one speech laden with anti-Muslim content, celebrated how ‘traitors’ are ‘sent to their deaths’ in his state), Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma (who, on at least one occasion, questioned Muslims’ loyalty and called for them to be kicked out of Jharkhand), Madhya Pradesh Chief Minister Mohan Yadav and Maharashtra Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis (both of whom characterised the election as a ‘dharmyudh’/holy religious war), among many others. Again, India’s electoral and police authorities failed to take decisive action.

In addition to the role played by the BJP’s top leadership (highlighted above), local-level leaders, including some holding elected office, continued to play a crucial role in keeping sectarian tensions boiling. Recurring figures included:

  • Nitesh Rana, BJP MLA in Maharashtra: Throughout the year, Rane was reported to have attended dozens of anti-Muslim hate rallies and openly called for the economic boycott of Muslims, the destruction of Muslim-owned property, and, on multiple occasions, incited anti-Muslim violence. In January, Rane’s inflammatory rhetoric was reported to have contributed to the eruption of anti-Muslim violence in Mumbai’s Mira Road area. In June, Rane was reported to have issued a bounty on the tongue of a senior Muslim parliamentarian. In December, after the BJP emerged as the largest party in the state’s legislative assembly, Rane, who reportedly has at least 38 criminal cases pending against him, was promoted and appointed a minister in the state cabinet.
  • T. Raja Singh, BJP MLA in Telangana: Throughout the year, Singh was reported to have attended dozens of anti-Muslim hate rallies and openly called for the economic boycott of Muslims, the destruction of Muslim-owned property, and, on multiple occasions, incited anti-Muslim violence. In August, Singh was reported to have called on his followers to learn how to use weapons and to apply for gun licenses en masse.

Throughout the year, other popular Hindu nationalist figures continued to organise public events where local-level leaders demonised minorities by peddling common conspiracy theories—such as the ‘love jihad’ charge against Muslims, and the charge of unlawful mass conversions against Christians, and of India’s Hindu majority being at risk of demographic overhaul—and openly incited discrimination, hostility, and violence. Open calls for social and economic boycotts, as well as open calls for violence, were common and continued to be reported throughout the period under review. Top’ level incitement events continued unabated in public rallies and events, particularly in states like Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh, Assam, and Gujarat, among others (see Hate & Violence Hotspots map). At least 25 such events were reported in December alone. Recurring speakers at such events included influential figures such as Yati Narsinghanand Saraswati (who inflamed communal tensions across Uttar Pradesh by calling on his followers to burn an effigy of Prophet Mohammad), Kajal Shingala, and Suresh Chavhanke.

These events were mostly organised by groups such as the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and the Bajrang Dal (BD), militant outfits spawned by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)* to, according to scholars, act as its armed wing, as well as lead various grassroots-level ‘everyday communalism’ campaigns that keep majoritarian attitudes and religious hostilities alive. *The RSS is the ideological fountainhead of modern Hindu nationalism, and the BJP has acted as its political wing.

The grave abuses detailed in previous sections took place amid the continuing embrace of authoritarian governance methods, and the continuing adoption of discriminatory policies and practices by BJP governments at both the national and state levels. Manifestations of minority religions, particularly Islam, continued to be targeted by the state, paving the way for further attacks by non-state actors. BJP-led governments also targeted minority property, livelihoods and education, as well as voting rights, as part of collective punishment measures, further deepening the marginalisation and exclusion they have historically faced in India.

In 2024, India witnessed the state privileging of Hinduism and Hindu interests on a hitherto unprecedented scale. Alongside, the conditions for religious minorities continued to steadily deteriorate, as they faced sustained attacks from both state and non-state actors. Key developments and trends included:

  • Consecration of Ram Temple in Ayodhya: In January, 31 years after Hindu extremists led by senior leaders of the BJP illegally destroyed the historical Babri Masjid mosque that had stood in Ayodhya (UP) for over 500 years, PM Modi led the consecration ceremony for a temple being constructed at the same site. The construction of the temple, formally overseen by a trust set up by the Indian government, was enabled by a Supreme Court verdict in 2019, which had ended a longstanding legal dispute by handing over the site of the demolished mosque to Hindu parties, despite also finding that the destruction of the mosque was an illegal act, and despite the absence of conclusive archaeological evidence that a Hindu temple had ever stood at the site. The ceremony marked the culmination of Hindu nationalists’ decades-long Ram Janmabhoomi (Birthplace of Lord Ram) movement, which had sought to replace the erstwhile mosque with a temple honouring Lord Ram, a deity who many Hindus believe was born at the same site. This ‘achievement’–described by PM Modi as the ‘dawn of a new era’ for India and by critics as further cementing India’s Hindu-supremacist turn–was a major poll plank of the BJP during the 2024 General Election, despite legal prohibitions on seeking votes in the name of religion.
  • State-supported moves to replace religious character of other historical mosques: Hindu nationalists’ efforts to ‘reclaim’ other historical mosques–despite a law that prohibits the changing of the character of any place of worship as it existed on the day of India’s independence in 1947–received another jolt in January, when a local court in Varanasi (UP), permitted Hindu litigants to offer prayers inside the seventeenth century Gyanvapi Mosque, the site of a historical dispute between Hindu nationalists and Muslims. In November, local authorities began the survey of the Shahi Masjid (mosque) in Sambhal (UP), sparking protests where police shot dead five Muslims. (See Deprivation of Life.) These were the latest in a series of similar surveys by local authorities in several BJP-ruled states, prompted by Hindu groups’ attempts to challenge the ownership of the properties in question, using the legal process. These attempts have proceeded despite the presence of a law that prevents conversion of the religious character of buildings, enacted after the Babri mosque in Ayodhya was illegally demolished by Hindu extremists in 1992. A 2022 ruling by the Supreme Court had created a pathway for claimants to circumvent the ban, a ruling that is being used increasingly by Hindu groups to file claims against multiple historical mosques, claiming they were temples. In December, the SC issued a nationwide directive temporarily staying, but not preventing, suits seeking similar surveys.

  • Repeal of family-based laws and enactment of Uniform Civil Code in Uttarakhand: In March, BJP-governed Uttarakhand became the first state in independent India to repeal all religion-based family laws and enact a Uniform Civil Code (UCC). Different religious communities in India are governed by different family and personal laws that address matters of marriage, divorce, and inheritance, among other issues. While India’s constitution contains a non-enforceable directive to the state to implement a UCC across the country, such a move has so far not been pursued due to objections from religious minorities that it would infringe on their religious practices.
  • Continuing abuse of anti-conversion laws against Muslims and Christians in BJP-governed states: Throughout the year, BJP-governed states, particularly Uttar Pradesh, continued to invoke draconian provincial-level anti-conversion statutes to target and incarcerate Christian faith leaders and, increasingly, Muslim men accused of being in inter-religious relationships with Hindu women (see section on Arrests and Detentions.) In September, UP enacted stricter amendments to its anti-conversion law, introducing stricter penalties and broadening its scope. UP also recorded the first wave of convictions under the law: among those convicted were 12 Muslims (including two prominent scholars), whom the judge, while passing the order, accused of being involved in ‘unconventional warfare’ against the state, and three Christians, reportedly based on the testimony of a BJP worker. Two BJP-governed states – Assam and Rajasthan – have announced plans to enact new legislation restricting religious conversions, particularly in the context of marriages. Such laws are now active in 12 states.

Alongside, authorities in several BJP-governed states – such as Maharashtra, Uttarakhand (see section on Deprivation of Life), Uttar Pradesh, and Gujarat – continued to target minority places of worship and other religious buildings of minorities via summary demolitions. At the time of writing, Hindu extremists in anti-Muslim hotspot states like Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand were escalating their calls for the demolition of allegedly illegally-constructed mosques. Mosques, churches and other religious properties also continued to be the target of Hindu extremists’ ire during episodes of mass violence, reported throughout the year. (See section on Torture.)

Throughout 2024, authorities in BJP-governed states continued the nationwide trend of Muslims being collectively punished through arbitrary demolitions of their property, as well as arbitrary attachment of their property. Supreme Court intervention late in the year would slow—but not halt—the trend.

The first major punitive demolition drives were reported in Mumbai in January, in the immediate aftermath of anti-Muslim mass violence against the backdrop of the consecration of the Ram Temple (see Torture), with authorities razing at least 55 buildings in the Muslim-concentration Mira Road and Mohammed Ali Road localities, in separate demolition drives.

In February, a week after the violence over the demolition of a mosque in Haldwani (see Arbitrary Deprivation of Life), authorities were reported to have begun proceedings to confiscate the properties of at least nine Muslims out of 58 officially arrested. Also in February, in Alwar (Rajasthan), at least 12 houses belonging to Muslims were arbitrarily demolished by authorities over allegations that they had sold beef.

Pretexts in other seemingly punitive demolitions included allegations that the victims had been involved in, inter alia, cow slaughter, religious conversion, and other crimes against Hindus. Among those targeted was opposition politician Haji Shahzad Ali, whose house was demolished by authorities after he was accused of leading a protest against an anti-Muslim hate speech made by a local Hindu monk. (see a list of 12 such cases reported between June and August, here.)

In September, the Supreme Court issued a temporary stay on all demolitions without its prior permission. In November, the SC issued guidelines to be followed in future during demolitions, including a mandatory notice period, personal hearing, and other transparency measures, as well as measures to ensure accountability for non-compliance. (An offer by the UN Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing—who characterised punitive demolitions as an ‘aggravated form of human rights violations—to assist in the formulation of these guidelines was rejected by the court. Since the SC’s stay, authorities in BJP-governed states have reportedly carried out at least four more physical demolitions (in Gujarat, Uttarakhand, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh). In December, after the SC’s guidelines were issued, local authorities in Fatehpur (UP) partly demolished the Noori Jama Masjid, a 180-year-old mosque, claiming that part of the mosque along with 133 nearby houses and shops were encroachments on government land.

In 2024, two BJP-led state governments announced policy measures giving credence to ‘spit jihad’, an unfounded conspiracy theory alleging an organised plot by Muslims to endanger Hindus by spitting in and contaminating their food.

In UP, the state government announced plans to enact a law mandating, inter alia, the public display of owners’ and managers’ names at eateries, and punitive measures against food establishment employees confirmed to be ‘illegal foreign citizens’. In Uttarakhand, police authorities announced that offenders would face charges under existing laws relating to food adulteration, public nuisance, and, if applicable, incitement of religious enmity. Previously, police authorities in the two states had mandated the public display of employees’ names at eateries along the route of the Hindu kanwariya pilgrimage. The latest, state-wide measures will circumvent a Supreme Court stay on those directives.

In other locations, local BJP leaders (such as BJP councillor Ravinder Singh Negi in Delhi, and BJP MLA Balmukund Acharya in Rajasthan) have led local campaigns targeting Muslim-owned businesses, demanding they display their names and accusing them of hiding their identities.

Such measures serve the twin purposes of normalising and deepening anti-Muslim conspiracy theories and hate, as well as enabling the easy identification and targeting of Muslim workers and Muslim-owned businesses, by exclusion or other means. Hindu extremists across the country continue to openly call for the social and economic boycott of Muslims and physically target Muslim-owned businesses during episodes of mass violence.

In March, the Uttar Pradesh state High Court struck down the state’s Board of Madrasa Education Act, nullifying the constitutional validity of the body mandated to grant academic distinctions, conduct exams and prescribe instructional material under the Islamic madrassa system. The court further ordered the state government to accommodate current madrassa students within the formal schooling system. The Supreme Court subsequently stayed the HC’s order, noting that it would impact the education of nearly 1.7 million madrassa students. Separately, a Special Investigation Team (SIT) in UP found over 13000 madrassas to be operating in the state, and recommended their closure.

In October, the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR), India’s premier child rights body, issued communications to all provincial-level governments, recommending that state funding to madrassas and madrassa boards be stopped, and that children attending madrassas be enrolled in ‘formal’ schools.

In recent years, BJP-governed states, like Assam, have moved to close down all madrassas, with several hundred already ceasing operations.Madrassas remain a crucial avenue of primary education for millions of Muslim children across the country.

Throughout the year, Hindu extremists in several hate & violence hotspots sustained their calls for the social and economic boycott of Muslims, with major boycott campaigns reported from Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh, and Maharashtra, among others. Hindu extremists also violently targeted Muslim-owned businesses and property on multiple occasions. (See section on Torture.)

New research appeared to reveal that the normalisation of such rhetoric and violence is leading to the hardening of majoritarian and discriminatory attitudes towards Muslims:

  • Several nation-wide surveys published in 2024 (India Today Mood of the Nation) and earlier confirmed widespread support among the majority Hindu population not just for the BJP government, but even for formerly-fringe conspiracy theories like ‘love jihad’.
  • A nationwide survey published in November 2024 revealed further the prevalence of discriminatory attitudes among the majority Hindu population: a quarter of all Hindus disagreed with the notion that Indian Muslims are as patriotic as other Indians, while nearly half agreed that Muslims are ‘unnecessarily appeased or pampered’. Over 60% claimed that Indian Muslims are equally safe as other citizens, in contrast to two-in-three Muslims revealing that they do not feel equally safe in the country.

Throughout the year, this hardening of ant-Muslim bias manifested in the form of scores of reported instances of Muslims facing discrimination from non-state actors. These included objections from Hindu residents to Muslims purchasing homes in their neighbourhood (Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat), Muslim students (including hijab-clad girls) facing harassment and violence at educational institutions, and Muslim employees facing harassment and violence at the workplace, among others.

New research also appeared to confirm that socio-economic disparities may be widening even further. A study published in July found that the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, in 2020, disproportionately impacted Muslims and Dalits: the life expectancy for Muslims went down by 5.4 years in 2020, and 2.7 years for Dalits, compared to 1.3 years for ‘upper’ caste Hindus. Research published in 2023 had confirmed that Muslims are India’s poorest religious group (measured by asset and consumption levels), have the lowest level of access to public services, and are the only religious group to witness declining levels in higher education enrolment.

During the 2024 General Election, there were multiple instances of minority voters reportedly being denied the right to exercise their franchise – in Sambhal (UP), dozens of Muslim voters alleged that they were assaulted and denied the right to vote by police personnel. In Devbhumi Dwarka (Gujarat), over 700 Muslim fishermen were denied the right to vote after their names were arbitrarily deleted from the electoral rolls. Victims of previous voter suppression methods–such as the nearly 100,000 individuals declared as ‘Doubtful Voters’ on suspicion of being illegal migrants to Assam state–also continued to be denied the right to vote. (The 2024 GE was also marred by other broader, serious violations of electoral integrity. See more detailed coverage here.) Instances of state-led attempts to deny voting rights were also reported during subsequent legislative assembly and parliamentary polls and by-polls later in the year: allegations of voter suppression and police brutality were made in 8 out of 15 by-poll seats in UP in November, including in Meerapur, where a police officer was reportedly seen brandishing a gun and threatening Muslim voters.

As in previous years, particularly those under the BJP-led regime that has been in place since 2014, India’s domestic mechanisms continued to largely fail to ensure accountability for ongoing, recent, and previous violations. The judicial process, from filing a complaint to securing convictions and other remedies, continued to be dangerously skewed towards powerful Hindu nationalist interests, and against those of marginalised minorities.

As was most recently seen in the aftermath of the police killings of Muslim protesters in Sambhal in November (see Deprivation of Life), victims and families seeking justice continued to be routinely harassed, and faced retributive action themselves, including in the form of arrests and arbitrary demolition/attachment of property, throughout the year.

In recent years, the independence of India’s higher judiciary—as well as the impartiality of judges—has come under heavy scrutiny, with sustained allegations of partisanship in favour of the BJP-led government, often at the cost of minority interests. Even on the rare occasions when the courts have attempted to step in, a sense of permissiveness and impunity continue to prevail among State and non-State actors accused of violations. SC directives issued in 2017 to curb religiously-motivated mob violence, and in 2022 to curb the proliferation of anti-Muslim hate and incitement, both continue to go largely unheeded, particularly by public authorities in BJP-governed states. SC directives regarding property demolitions, issued in November, too are already being circumvented.

These failures of justice themselves are enabled by the permissive environment against minorities and other marginalised sections, created by senior ruling party officials, who rather than acting to check abuses and discrimination, continued to openly incite it in 2024. This is a trend that is only hardening since the recent return of the BJP in parliamentary elections, where it only managed to hold on to power, not on its own, but in coalition with other parties. A weak BJP continues, counter intuitively, to be a significant threat to minority rights and protection in India. 

Highlighted below are a few illustrative examples from 2024, of the failures of the domestic justice system:

As detailed earlier, India’s 2024 General Election was marked by an unprecedented spike in anti-Muslim hate speech, led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and other senior state officials (see section on Advocacy of Religious Hatred).

India’s electoral authorities, which enjoy expansive powers, refused to take any meaningful action regarding this communal fearmongering, which had formed the core of the BJP’s election messaging. Regarding contentious speeches by Modi—including those where he made direct references to Muslims—the Election Commission of India (ECI) issued only a notice to the BJP’s President, without mentioning Modi. It took no further action despite Modi and other senior BJP leaders continuing their incendiary sectarian rhetoric through to the end of the election period.

In violation of the Supreme Court’s 2022 and 2023 directives to all state governments to take suo motu action in cases of hate speech, police in no state registered suo motu cases during the GE. Despite this flagrant refusal of the authorities to comply with its own directives, the SC and state-level High Courts refused to entertain pleas by petitioners seeking remedy. This lack of accountability from India’s public authorities during the GE appeared to incentivise the normalisation of the use of sectarian anti-Muslim rhetoric during elections, with dozens of similar speeches reportedly made during state-level elections and by-elections in October-November.

Occasional outbreaks of violence continued to be reported from the north-eastern state of Manipur, which has been rocked by inter-ethnic violence since May 2023, between members of the predominantly-Hindu Meitei group and the predominantly-Christian Kuki-Zo tribes. The total death toll has risen to over 225, with Kukis accounting for the bulk of the casualties. 

The violence in Manipur was marked by widespread reports of sexual violence and other abuses against women, including gang rape, mostly against those from the Kuki-Zo communities. In September 2023, the Manipur State Commission for Women had revealed that it had registered 59 cases of sexual crimes against women. The real scale of sexual violence is believed to be much higher, with Kuki women in particular reportedly living in fear of retaliation and further violence if they lodge official complaints.

In July, an Amnesty report condemned Indian authorities for being ‘missing in action’ and failing to end the cycle of violence and displacement, and for perpetuating impunity for members of armed Meitei militant groups. Amnesty found 32 instances of members of armed Meitei groups committing gender-based violence against those belonging to ethnic tribal communities, with none inviting prosecution by authorities. Amnesty also found at least three instances of members of tribal communities barriers in getting their complaints officially registered by police. Despite the Indian Supreme Court forming a committee in August 2023 to look into survivor relief, Amnesty found that the conditions in shelter camps, which still hold more than 50,000 internally displaced persons, continued to be dire. 

In August, the residents of  Nuh (Haryana) marked the completion of one year since the anti-Muslim mass violence that had resulted in six deaths, and in thousands of Muslims being forcibly displaced. In the post-violence state action that followed, government authorities had exclusively targeted Muslims, summarily demolishing over 1200 Muslim-owned residences and businesses, and conducting discriminatory mass arrests of over 400 Muslims. The vindictive state action had led a court to remark whether it was an ‘exercise in ethnic cleansing’.

Media reports revealed anecdotes of the continuing legal struggles faced by the region’s Muslims, and the fear and uncertainty that continues to grip them. Of those arrested, at least 30 people, including teenagers, are still reported to be languishing in jail.

In July, the Delhi High Court ordered the transfer of the investigation into the death of a Muslim man, allegedly at the hands of police during the 2020 anti-Muslim violence in Delhi, to the Central Bureau of Investigation. A video of the incident had shown 23-year-old Faizan, along with several others, lying semi-conscious on the road while being assaulted by police officials and goaded to sing the national anthem.

The Court remarked that Delhi Police’s probe into its own officials so far had born ‘too little, too late’. The court also noted that the investigation had appeared to ‘conveniently spare’ police officials who were suspected to be involved in the incident. Delhi Police officials had been accused of involvement in at least 3 killings of Muslims during the 2020 violence that had left 53 dead in North-East Delhi. No arrests have been reported so far in any of these cases.

Alongside, a news outlet highlighted procedural gaps in the bail hearings of Muslim activists and students who have been scapegoated and incarcerated for nearly five years in connection with the 2020 anti-Muslim targeted mass violence in Delhi. The report found that the bail applications of eight Muslims accused in the ‘conspiracy’ case have been listed before the Delhi High Court dozens of times, but have not been decided on due to the judges leading the benches hearing the cases being transferred out. The result of this has been the extended incarceration of the accused, in contravention of Supreme Court directives calling for bail applications to be decided expeditiously.

The Delhi riots ‘conspiracy’ case refers to the charge by police authorities that 20 students, activists, and local politicians conspired to organise communal riots. 18 of the 20 accused in the case are Muslims. Twelve of the accused, all Muslims, remain in jail, charged under the anti-terror Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) and other provisions of the penal code.