India Persecution Tracker | 2025 | January – March

Overview of human rights abuses and violations against India’s religious minorities from 1 January to 31 March, 2025.
Key Figures (Jan – Mar, 2025)
STATE ACTORS
  • Six extrajudicial killings of Muslims by police and security forces
  • 100+ instances of arbitrary arrest or detention of Muslims
  • Dozens of punitive demolitions/evictions targeting Muslims, in defiance of Supreme Court orders
NON-STATE ACTORS
  • Five Muslims killed in incidents involving mob violence or vigilante attacks by Hindu extremist non-state actors
  • Dozens injured, one killed in mass violence initiated by Hindu extremists in seven states, marked by widespread targeting of Muslim property and places of worship
  • 50+ Muslims injured in other communally-motivated hate crimes by Hindu extremists

In the first quarter of 2025, India witnessed the further entrenchment of state-backed policies and practices that fragment society along religious lines. These measures continued to institutionalise the differential treatment of minorities, particularly Muslims, and reinforce Hindu majoritarian dominance. The Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), in power since 2014, continued to pursue its ideology of exclusion with sustained ruthlessness, despite its electoral setbacks in 2024. Led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the BJP continued to empower hardline actors both within the state and outside it, enabling grave anti-minority abuses and curtailing basic democratic freedoms. One observer described the country’s trajectory as ‘the rise of an apartheid state’.

A brief overview of key developments between 1 January and 31 March, 2025:

  • At least six Muslims were killed in incidents involving police and security forces, across four states. These included a custodial death in Uttar Pradesh, the killing of a one-and-a-half-month-old baby during a police raid in Rajasthan, and four civilian deaths in three separate incidents in Kashmir.  (Deprivation of Life – State Actors)

    At least five more Muslims were killed in incidents involving mob violence or vigilante attacks by Hindu extremist non-state actors, across five states. These included fatal mob lynchings in Uttar Pradesh, Tripura and Haryana, and a schoolgirl’s killing in Telangana while defending her father from violent assailants. (Deprivation of Life – Non-State Actors)

  • Religious tensions and targeted mass violence against Muslims were reported in seven states across the country (Bihar, Gujarat, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh), against the backdrop of Ramadan and Holi. Recurring patterns in each location included the playing/chanting of inflammatory (and often violent) slogans/speeches by Hindu processionists, the subsequent vandalism of Muslim residences, businesses and places of worship, as well as the tendency of state authorities in BJP-governed states to subject Muslims to reprisals, including via indiscriminate mass arrests. Reprisals also continued in Sambhal (Uttar Pradesh), where police had shot dead five Muslims amid protests in November 2024, and in Kashmir, where over 500 civilians were detained after the murder of an ex-soldier. (Torture and Ill-Treatment: Non-State Actors) (Arrests and Detentions)

  • Hate speech and incitement against Muslims continued to surge across the country, led by senior BJP leaders, Hindu extremist groups, and religious figures operating with impunity. The campaign for the February 2025 Delhi Assembly election saw senior BJP leaders repeat the same anti-Muslim rhetoric deployed during the 2024 General Election, when PM Modi had referred to India’s Muslims as ‘infiltrators’. State-level leaders and other Hindu extremists continued their calls for social and economic boycotts as well as violence against Muslims. Mass hate rallies were reported in multiple states (Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Assam, Gujarat and Maharashtra, among others), usually with the patronage of various outfits operating as part of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) network. In a striking example of the normalisation of hate and violence, political leaders who were previously accused of inciting mass violence were elevated to top positions in national capital Delhi’s new government. Enforcement of Supreme Court directives to curb hate speech continued to be widely ignored by authorities across the country. (Advocacy of Religious Hatred)

  • At the policy level, India’s Parliament introduced sweeping legislative changes that could undermine the autonomy of Muslim religious and charitable endowments across the country and pave the way for the state takeover of property owned and used by Muslims for centuries. Alongside, BJP-ruled state governments continued to carry out punitive demolitions and evictions targeting Muslims and their property, in defiance of Supreme Court directives that had mandated due process. BJP states also continued to openly discriminate against Muslims in access to education and livelihoods, while intensifying efforts to culturally marginalise them. The conditions for religious freedom remained dire, especially in states where anti-conversion laws are weaponised against Muslims and Christians. The targeting of Muslims, both by state and non-state actors, also continued to be fuelled by cow protection laws that are now in place in 20 of India’s states, with many now having provisions that empower violent ‘vigilante’ groups to function in a quasi-official manner and assist with the implementation of these laws, with impunity.  (Discrimination in Access to Economic, Social & Cultural Rights) (Religious Freedom)

  • Across the board, India’s domestic mechanisms continued to fail to ensure effective remedy and accountability for these and past abuses, with state institutions and the judicial process remaining skewed towards powerful Hindu nationalist interests, and against minorities. A new, countrywide survey of police personnel revealed staggering levels of Islamophobia (over half of all Hindu respondents felt Muslims are ‘naturally prone’ to committing crimes), support for extrajudicial punishments (22% of all respondents favoured ‘encounter’ killings of ‘dangerous criminals’), and disregard for due process (38% of all respondents preferred police giving extrajudicial punishments for minor offences instead of a legal trial). The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) published a new report, warning that systemic weaknesses along with executive overreach by the BJP-led central government are severely threatening the fair administration of justice in India. (Lack of Effective Remedy)

  • Along with this persecution of religious minorities, Indian authorities also continued to target critical journalists and human rights defenders, arresting or re-arresting some (like journalists Dilwar Mozumder and Mahesh Langa, and trade union activist Bachha Singh), while registering criminal cases against others (like fact-checker Mohammad Zubair and journalist Rana Ayyub). An anti-terror special court ordered a probe into NGOs providing legal aid to Muslims, while a journalists’ collective that had reported on corruption involving the BJP and its corporate donors had its non-profit status cancelled. (Shrinking Civic Space)

    Such actions continued to be reflected in India’s performance in international indices tracking states’ adherence to democratic principles. The V-Dem Institute, in its 2025 Democracy Report, classified India, yet again, as an ‘electoral autocracy’ for the ninth year running, while noting that India’s score had fallen even further compared to the previous year.

  • Against this backdrop, international experts continued to raise the alarm about the situation in India. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, in his Global Update to the Human Rights Council, expressed his concern about the continuing abuse of restrictive laws to target HRDs and journalists, as well as the prevailing situation in Kashmir and Manipur. The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) designated India as a ‘Country of Particular Concern’ for the sixth year running, while also recommending sanctions against India’s external intelligence agency for its alleged role in transnational repression. The Indian government continued to dismiss these concerns as ‘biased and politically motivated’, and ‘unfounded and baseless’.

During the period under review, at least six Muslim civilians were killed in incidents involving police and security forces, across four states. These included a custodial death in Uttar Pradesh, the killing of an infant during a police raid in Rajasthan, and four civilian deaths in three separate incidents in Jammu & Kashmir.

20 January, 2025 (Sambhal, Uttar Pradesh): Mohammad Irfan, a 45-year-old fruit vendor and heart patient, died in police custody at the Raisatti police outpost in Sambhal, Uttar Pradesh. His family alleged that he was assaulted, denied access to critical heart medication, and died shortly after being detained by police.

According to family members, police arrived at the victim’s home in connection with a family dispute, verbally abused Irfan and his relatives, and forcibly took him to the outpost without allowing him to take his prescribed medication. Irfan reportedly collapsed at the outpost and could not be revived.

Police denied the allegations, claiming Irfan was given his medication and taken to hospital after his health deteriorated. Authorities claimed that initial findings suggest cardiac arrest as the cause of death and warned against ‘rumours’ about the incident. The death sparked local protests and public condemnation. Since November 2024, when police forces shot dead five Muslims amid protests against a mosque survey, Muslims in Sambhal have faced a systematic crackdown by authorities, marked by arbitrary arrests, retaliatory evictions, denial of access to services, and other coercive measures. (Also see section on Arrests and Detentions.)

2 March, 2025 (Alwar, Rajasthan): Alishba, a one-and-a-half-month-old infant, was reportedly killed during an early morning police raid at her family’s home in Raghunathgarh village, Alwar district. According to the family, police entered the home of Imran Ali, a daily-wage labourer, without prior notice or a warrant. During the raid, an officer allegedly stepped on the infant while attempting to apprehend Imran, who was sleeping on a nearby bed. The child died on the spot.

The raid was part of Operation Antivirus, a cybercrime crackdown launched in June 2024 targeting alleged online fraud in the Mewat region. Local residents and community leaders allege that such raids have disproportionately targeted Meo Muslims, an ethnic group native to the Mewat region, and that such raids are often conducted without search warrants, FIRs, or the presence of female officers, as is mandated by the Supreme Court in cases involving women and children.

At least five officers were reportedly booked in connection with the incident. No electronic evidence was recovered from the residence. Protests broke out in the district following the infant’s death, with local residents demanding accountability.

Between early February and mid-March 2025, at least four deaths of Muslim civilians were reported in Jammu & Kashmir under circumstances involving police or military action:

  • 5 February, 2025 (Kathua, Jammu & Kashmir): Makhan Din, a 25-year-old labourer from the Gujjar Muslim tribal community, died by suicide after recording a video alleging he had been tortured by police who accused him of having links to militants. In the video, Din swore on the Quran that he had no such ties and stated he had been forced by police to make a false confession. Shortly after being allowed to return home to retrieve his phone, he consumed poison and died while being taken to hospital. A magisterial and departmental inquiry was announced, but the victim’s family alleged that they had received no updates, and that no arrests had been made. Police denied all allegations of torture.
  • 6 February, 2025 (Baramulla, Jammu & Kashmir): Waseem Ahmad Mir, a 32-year-old truck driver, was shot dead by the Army after allegedly failing to stop at a checkpoint. Army officials claimed they fired at the truck’s tyres following a 23 km chase, but a doctor who operated on the victim told reporters that the fatal bullet entered through his back. The victim’s family insisted that he had no prior criminal record and did not pose a threat. A formal investigation was initiated, but key details, such as CCTV footage and the FIR, have reportedly not been shared with the family.
  • 13–15 March, 2025 (Kulgam, Jammu & Kashmir): The bodies of two brothers, 25-year-old Riyaz Ahmad Bajad and 18-year-old Showkat Ahmad Bajad, were recovered from the Veshaw River a month after they went missing following a wedding. Riyaz’s body reportedly bore signs of torture, including burns, blisters, and neck injuries, though preliminary post-mortem findings cited drowning. The family disputed this version and alleged foul play. A protest demanding justice was met with police violence; video footage showed an officer kicking women demonstrators. Police have stated that an investigation is ongoing.

Across these cases, families have alleged torture, procedural lapses, and selective or inadequate state response, especially in contrast to the case of a former soldier who was killed by militants around the same time, where the state quickly issued compensation and detained over 500 people. These cases are illustrative of a persisting pattern of impunity for Indian security forces operating in Kashmir. (Also see section on Right to Effective Remedy.)


The cases highlighted above raise serious concerns under international human rights law, particularly with respect to the right to life, the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment, and the state’s duty to ensure effective investigation and accountability. The failure to uphold these obligations, particularly in cases involving Muslims, serves as further evidence of their discriminatory treatment by state authorities, as well as of the apparent impunity enjoyed by alleged perpetrators.

(In 2023 and 2024, we had documented 20 and 21 extrajudicial killings of Muslims by state authorities, respectively. See our 2024 Overview here.)

During the period under review, at least five Muslims were killed in incidents involving mob violence or vigilante attacks by Hindu extremist non-state actors, across five states. These included fatal mob lynchings in Uttar Pradesh, Tripura and Haryana, a schoolgirl’s killing in Telangana while defending her father from violent assailants, and another death in Uttar Pradesh amid communal tensions during the Hindu Holi festival. Two of the killings were reportedly carried out by members of organised cow protection groups.

(While the India Persecution Tracker focuses on violations against Muslims and other religious minorities, the period under review also saw the deaths of two Hindu men in contexts related to cow-related violence: a youth who died by suicide in Durg (Chhattisgarh) on 19 January shortly after his house was raided by Hindu extremists who accused him of storing beef; and a truck driver’s assistant who was killed in Palwal (Haryana) on 22 February.)

13–18 January, 2025 (Saharanpur, Uttar Pradesh): Mohd Salman, a 27-year-old Muslim man, died after being violently assaulted by villagers in Nawada village, Saharanpur district. The attack occurred on 13 January; he died five days later during treatment.

According to police, Salman and another Muslim man (Rafid) were captured by villagers while attempting to rob the home of a local resident. The villagers reportedly proceeded to tie both men upside down and beat them with sticks. Police further claimed that the duo was handed over to their custody by the villagers, and that Salman succumbed to his injuries while receiving medical treatment.

Graphic video footage of the assault circulated widely on social media, showing Salman hanging by his legs as he was repeatedly struck by multiple men.

While an FIR was registered against Salman and Rafid for the alleged robbery, there has been no confirmed progress in prosecuting those responsible for the assault. Authorities stated that a full investigation would be conducted, but no arrests had been reported as of late January.

10 February, 2025 (Belonia, Tripura): Babul Mia, a 35-year-old Muslim man, died after being violently assaulted by a group of men at a construction site in Belonia.

According to police, Mia was allegedly caught while scaling the school’s boundary wall, purportedly to steal construction materials. The accused, who included school employees and labourers, reportedly beat him severely and tied him to a tree, where he was left overnight. The next morning, local police found Mia unconscious. He was declared dead upon arrival at a local hospital.

Six individuals were reportedly arrested in connection with the killing, including three employees of the school. The victim’s family alleged that the police initially failed to register the case under newly introduced provisions in India’s criminal law that pertain to group-perpetrated murder (Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, Sec. 103.1), and instead sought to portray the victim as a thief.

11–15 February, 2025 (Zaheerabad, Telangana): Aliya Begum, a 15-year-old Muslim girl and 10th-grade student, died after being attacked while trying to protect her father (Mohd Ismail) from an assault by a group of men in Antharam village, Zaheerabad.

The incident occurred on 11 February after Ismail was allegedly seen urinating in fields near the home of the two main accused. An altercation ensued, during which the men, reportedly joined by others, assaulted him. Aliya rushed to his defence but was hit with stones and sustained critical injuries.

Aliya was admitted to hospital and remained in intensive care until she succumbed to her injuries on 15 February. The two main accused were subsequently arrested and remanded to judicial custody.

15 March, 2025 (Unnao, Uttar Pradesh): Mohammad Sharif, a 48-year-old Muslim man and father of six, died shortly after allegedly being assaulted by a group of Hindu Holi revellers in Unnao. According to multiple eyewitnesses and family members, Sharif had objected to having colours thrown on him while walking to the mosque during Ramadan.

The police have claimed that Sharif died of cardiac arrest and that no injury marks were found on his body. This has been strongly disputed by his family and local residents, who allege that he was beaten in full view of bystanders and that multiple eyewitnesses saw the assault.

An FIR was registered based on a complaint by Sharif’s brother-in-law, naming five Hindu individuals. Three were reportedly taken into custody. Charges invoked include culpable homicide not amounting to murder, intentional insult, and constructive liability within unlawful assembly.

Protests broke out in Unnao following the killing, with residents demanding justice. Sharif’s funeral was held the same night with a large public turnout. Days later, police filed a second FIR naming 117 people, including several of Sharif’s relatives, for alleged ‘rioting’ during the funeral procession. While no arrests had been made as of reporting, locals alleged that the police were attempting to intimidate witnesses and shield the accused.

25 January, 2025 (Palwal, Haryana): Yusuf, a 45-year-old Muslim man and cattle rearer from Ghudpur village, was allegedly beaten to death by a mob in Palwal district while transporting a recently purchased cow and calf in a tempo. Yusuf owned around 30 animals and operated a small dairy business.

According to his family, the assailants were members of a local gau rakshak (cow protection) group who suspected Yusuf of smuggling cattle and violently attacked him. Yusuf later succumbed to his injuries.

Haryana Police initially registered an assault case but upgraded it to murder after Yusuf’s death. Ten individuals were reportedly named in the FIR. However, at the time of writing, no arrests were reported.

Later, despite being the victim, Yusuf was also posthumously booked, along with his driver, under sections of Haryana’s cow protection law. Since the beginning of the year, Haryana has witnessed a sharp spike in violent attacks by members of cow protection groups, with over 21 violent assaults reported in the first quarter alone.


The cases highlighted above raise serious concerns under international human rights law, particularly relating to the state’s duty to prevent, investigate, and provide effective remedy for violations by non-state actors. In several cases, police disputed eyewitness accounts, posthumously charged victims, or filed counter-cases against family members. These continuing failures reflect a broader pattern of impunity in cases of mob violence targeting Muslims.

In February 2025, the Indian Supreme Court dismissed a petition urging the Court to oversee enforcement of its own 2018 anti-luynching guidelines, which continue to be flouted across states. (See section on Lack of Effective Remedy.)

During the period under review, allegations of torture and ill-treatment of Muslims by state actors were reported from multiple cases, and included cases of police brutality, custodial abuse, and degrading treatment of child and women detainees.

In March 2025, BJP-governed Madhya Pradesh witnessed multiple instances of degrading treatment and extrajudicial punishment of Muslim men accused of cow slaughter, in line with a broader trend of communalised policing under the state’s declared ‘cow protection year’. Cases were reported from:

  • Ujjain (3 March): Two Muslim men were beaten and paraded by police through a busy locality after being accused of cow slaughter. The men were reportedly forced to chant humiliating slogans such as ‘The cow is our mother, the police is our father,’ while a police officer struck them with a baton. Despite clear video evidence, senior police officials dismissed the incident as ‘not such as serious matter’. Local Hindu extremists later garlanded and honoured the individuals involved.
  • Damoh (8 March): Five Muslim who were arrested for allegedly slaughtering a cow were similarly publicly paraded by police to court, where local lawyers attempted to assault them. Authorities also demolished their ‘illegal’ properties on the same day. Later, local authorities announced plans to demolish over 300 homes in the arrested men’s neighbourhood, alleging they were built without acquiring permission.  

On 9 March, BSF personnel in North 24 Parganas (West Bengal) reportedly assaulted a 51-year-old fisherman, causing permanent damage to his eye.

Family members named three BSF officers and alleged that a pump-action gun was used at close range. The BSF was also accused of obstructing treatment at AIIMS Kalyani and filing false drug-smuggling charges to cover up the incident.

At the time of writing, no arrests had been reported.

Six Muslim women who had been arrested under the anti-terror UAPA following the February 2024 violence in Haldwani (Uttarakhand) alleged that they were subjected to forced labour and degrading conditions during their seven-month incarceration.

Recently released on bail, the women reported being made to clean toilets and mop floors without compensation. One detainee described being beaten despite suffering from diabetes and kidney issues. Others cited threats from prison staff, denial of adequate food during Ramadan, and prolonged separation from young children, including a nine-month-old infant.

The women maintain that they were wrongfully implicated during a police crackdown that followed the demolition of a mosque and madrassa in early February 2024, which had triggered widespread protests and left at least seven people dead, including six who were shot dead by police.

Nine Muslim boys in Ramnagar (Uttar Pradesh) alleged that they faced degrading treatment, Islamophobic abuse, and forced labour while under detention at a juvenile correction facility.

According to a fact-finding report by the Association for Protection of Civil Rights (APCR), only Muslim detainees at the facility were made to clean floors and perform menial tasks. The boys, aged between 12 and 15, also reported being beaten with batons when they asked to use the restroom, and described being repeatedly called Islamophobic slurs such as ‘mullah’, ‘kattmullah’, and ‘Pakistani’.

The children had been detained by local police on 4 March, after CCTV footage reportedly showed them pelting stones at streetlights.

During the period under review, episodes of religiously motivated mass violence initiated by Hindu extremists were reported from seven states, mostly around or during Hindu festivals, resulting in dozens of injuries. In the aftermath of these episodes, authorities in BJP-governed states continued to selectively and arbitrarily punish Muslims, via mass arrests and punitive demolitions. And throughout the period under review, Muslims and Christians, including the Dalits and Adivasis among them, continued to be violently targeted on various other pretexts, such as cow protection, religious conversion, and inter-faith relationships.

During the period under review, Hindu extremist groups orchestrated multiple episodes of communal violence across multiple states, often using Hindu festivals like Holi or Islamic observances like Ramadan as a pretext. Common patterns included provocative rallies near mosques, targeted attacks on Muslim communities, and the spread of misinformation to inflame tensions. In several instances, authorities either failed to act or responded with selective punishment of Muslims, raising further concerns about institutional bias and impunity.

Bihar

On 13 January, in Purnia’s Doodhi Bhitta village, a mob of around 100 people reportedly attacked and torched Muslim homes after a Hindu woman eloped with a Muslim man, despite a magistrate declaring that the couple were adults and their relationship consensual.

On 16 February, in Jamui, communal clashes broke out during a Hanuman Chalisa procession that passed a mosque, leaving at least six injured, including a municipal official. Internet services were suspended and multiple arrests were made.

Gujarat

In Ahmedabad’s Vatva area in early March, Muslims returning from prayers during Ramadan were reportedly attacked with stones by Hindu extremists. Some victims, including children, were allegedly forced to chant Hindu religious slogans at knifepoint. Despite being provided names of the accused, police initially registered the case against ‘unknown’ individuals and only acted after video evidence was submitted.

Jharkhand

On 26 February, in Dumraon village in Hazaribagh district, communal clashes broke out over the installation of loudspeakers and flags during Maha Shivratri celebrations. At least 20 people were injured. Police made three arrests, citing CCTV evidence, and a peace committee meeting was convened the next day. A BJP MP (Sanjay Seth) made unsubstantiated claims blaming ‘Bangladeshi infiltrators’ for the violence.

On 14 March, fresh clashes broke out in the Ghorthamba area of Giridih district after a Holi procession was reportedly opposed by locals on a particular street. Stone-pelting ensued from both sides, and several vehicles were set ablaze before police were deployed to restore order.

Madhya Pradesh

On 9 March, in Mhow (Dr. Ambedkar Nagar), communal clashes broke out during celebrations of India’s cricket victory in the Champions Trophy. A Hindu mob allegedly waved saffron flags and shouted religious slogans outside the local mosque, prompting stone pelting and subsequently leading to violent clashes. Four people were injured, and multiple vehicles and a shop were set on fire. Police used tear gas and batons to disperse the crowd, and 13 people were arrested, at least 12 of whom were Muslims.

On 19 March, in Umracha village in Vidisha district, communal violence erupted after a Hindu girl died by suicide. Her brother accused a Muslim boy of speaking to her shortly before her death. Hindu mobs set fire to Muslim homes and vehicles before police intervened to restore order.

Maharashtra

On 17 March, communal violence erupted in Nagpur after VHP and Bajrang Dal members held a protest demanding the removal of Mughal emperor Aurangzeb’s tomb. The protest involved burning a symbolic grave wrapped in green cloth, which social media rumours falsely claimed bore Islamic verses. The protests followed a surge of Hindu nationalist outrage triggered by the recent release of a Bollywood film depicting Aurangzeb’s execution of Maratha ruler Sambhaji, which Maharashtra’s Deputy Chief Minister said had ‘ignited emotions’.

Violent clashes subsequently broke out across multiple neighbourhoods, with mobs torching around 60 vehicles and injuring over 30 people, including at least 15 police personnel. One Muslim man, Irfan Ansari, later died from injuries sustained in the violence.

Authorities arrested over 100 people, including minors, and registered multiple FIRs. Properties belonging to some Muslim accused were demolished by the municipal corporation, drawing criticism for violating Supreme Court orders on due process. At least six people, including a Muslim political leader, were charged with sedition and misinformation.

The incident occurred during Ramadan and was accompanied by a wave of hate speech on social media, where Hindutva accounts circulated coded references to the 1989 Bhagalpur massacre, using terms like ‘cauliflower farming’ to implicitly call for mass killings of Muslims.

Also in Maharashtra, in Ratnagiri district on 12 March, Hindus celebrating the Shimga festival reportedly tried to force their way into a local mosque and damaged its gates, while police reportedly failed to intervene. An FIR was later filed for unlawful assembly.

On 30 March, on the eve of Eid-ul-Fitr, a communal clash erupted in Malad, Mumbai, after two Hindu youths allegedly shouted religious slogans during evening prayers by Muslims, provoking an altercation. One arrest was reported.

Also on 30 March, 2025, a low-intensity blast caused structural damage to a mosque in Beed district (Maharashtra), on the eve of Eid-ul-Fitr. Two Hindu men were arrested within hours of the incident.

Punjab

On 14 March, during Holi celebrations in Ludhiana, a dispute over DJ music played by Hindus near a mosque escalated into communal clashes, with both sides reportedly engaging in heavy stone-pelting. Over 10 people were injured. Seven individuals were arrested.

Uttar Pradesh

On 14 March, during Holi celebrations in Unnao, intoxicated Hindu youths riding motorcycles hurled stones and pieces of clothing at Muslim homes while shouting communal slurs and abusive slogans. Despite police warnings, the group continued their rampage until authorities used force to disperse them. No injuries were reported, but the incident heightened tensions in the area.

During the period under review, Muslims across India continued to face violent hate crimes by Hindu extremists, including many affiliated with organised extremist groups affiliated with the BJP, like Bajrang Dal. Several attacks were triggered by ‘cow protection’ vigilantism or targeted against those involved in interfaith relationships. Many perpetrators operated with impunity or political protection, while police either refused to act or arrested Muslim victims instead. These incidents occurred across at least 10 Indian states. The highest number of incidents were reported from Maharashtra (26), Haryana (21), Madhya Pradesh (13), Uttar Pradesh (11), and Rajasthan (7), all BJP-governed states.

During the period under review, ethnic tensions in Manipur remained escalated, with renewed outbreaks of violence being reported even as the state came under President’s Rule following the resignation of Chief Minister Biren Singh in early February 2025. Since May 2023, inter-ethnic violence between the predominantly-Hindu Meitei and predominantly-Christian Kuki-Zo-Hmar communities has left over 260 dead and displaced more than 70,000 people. The BJP-led state government under Singh had been accused of siding with armed Meitei groups, enabling attacks on Kuki-Zo civilians and churches, and failing to ensure impartial protection and effective response from security forces.

On 8 March, at least one person was killed and 15 others injured during violent clashes between Kuki-Zo protesters and security forces in Kangpokpi district. The protests erupted after the state government announced new public bus services between the valley and hill districts, which were perceived by the hill-based Kuki-Zo community as an act of provocation. A proposed ‘march to the hills’ by a Meitei civil society group further escalated tensions, leading to confrontation and violence.

On 16 March, a tribal leader from the Hmar Inpui group was allegedly assaulted by unknown assailants in Churachandpur, prompting local protests and the imposition of prohibitory orders. Tensions escalated further on 19 March, when fresh clashes broke out between Hmar and Zomi groups in the same district, reportedly over a dispute involving the hoisting of a community flag. One person was killed in the violence, which broke out merely hours after the two communities’ apex bodies had reached a peace deal.

Meanwhile, on 27 February, the Meitei group Arambai Tenggol surrendered over 300 looted weapons to state authorities as part of a broader disarmament effort. However, fewer than 1,200 of an estimated 6,000 weapons looted from state armouries have been recovered, according to authorities.

Rights groups continue to raise concerns about impunity and lack of accountability in Manipur, particularly following recent revelations that a leaked audio tape allegedly implicating former CM Singh in the violence had a 93% voice match, according to a private forensic lab. The tape, which surfaced in July 2024, purportedly captures Singh admitting to shielding armed Meitei groups and expressing regret at not being able to ’shell bombs’ at Kukis. The Supreme Court is currently examining the matter.

United Christian Forum, an advocacy group, documented 834 ‘attacks’ on Christians across India in 2024, marking an increase of over 100 more than in 2023. UCF defines attack as instances of physical violence, killings, sexual harassment, threats, social exclusion, and vandalism. The highest number of cases were recorded in Uttar Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Madhya Pradesh.

This wave of attacks continues to be fuelled by provincial-level anti-conversion laws, now in force in 12 states, which are frequently misused to harass Christians under the pretext of preventing ‘forced’ conversions.

Some cases of anti-Christian targeting reported during the period under review included:

  • In January, in Chhattisgarh, a pregnant tribal Christian woman suffered a miscarriage following an alleged attack linked to her faith, triggering a broader appeal from Christian women leaders across the country for state intervention. In a letter to India’s President, they demanded accountability for rising violence against Christians, particularly in Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Tamil Nadu, and Manipur.
  • On 16 March, a statue of Mother Mary was vandalised in an attack on St. Mary’s Church in Mayur Vihar, Delhi, raising alarm among local Christians about the safety of places of worship.

On 17 March, three churches in Andhra Pradesh were attacked during Sunday worship by Hindu nationalist mobs, in what church leaders described as a coordinated and unprecedented assault. Several congregants were physically assaulted, and church property was vandalised.

The cases documented above raise serious concerns under international human rights law, particularly in relation to the rights to security of person, protection from torture and ill-treatment, and religious freedom. They act as further evidence of Indian authorities’ failure to meet their obligation to prevent, investigate, and provide remedy for violations perpetrated by non-state actors. In many cases, perpetrators operate with clear political or institutional protection, while victims faced police inaction, harassment, or even retaliatory charges, further entrenching a climate of impunity as well as eroding public trust in the domestic justice system.

During the period under review, authorities in BJP-governed states across the country continued to carry out arbitrary arrests and detentions of Muslims in a range of contexts. These included mass detentions in Kashmir, a sustained crackdown in Uttar Pradesh’s Sambhal district, and the continuing targeting of Muslims under anti-conversion and cow protection laws. Arrests were also reported in the aftermath of episodes of targeted mass violence, for expressions of religious or political identity, and in connection with politically motivated allegations of illegal immigration, among others.

During the period under review, Kashmir witnessed a fresh surge in detentions, continuing long-standing patterns of arbitrary deprivation of liberty in the region. While the space for independent journalism remains severely restricted in the region, notable reported developments included:

  • The mass detention of over 500 individuals across Kulgam, shortly after a retired soldier was shot dead by unidentified assailants on 3 February. An unnamed senior police officer was quoted in media reports as claiming that detentions of this scale had not occurred in recent memory, and that they were intended to ‘send a strong message’ to militants operating from Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Many of those detained were reportedly relatives of these militants.
  • The house arrest of Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, Kashmir’s chief cleric and a prominent separatist political figure, ahead of Eid prayers on 31 March. Farooq’s political group, the Awami Action Committee, had been banned weeks earlier under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), India’s anti-terror law. (also see section on Religious Freedom.)

Separately, on 18 March, the Jammu & Kashmir High Court ordered the release of journalist Majid Hyderi, detained since September 2023 under the Public Safety Act (PSA), which allows for preventive detention. The court found Hyderi’s detention to be ‘vague and arbitrary’, noting that criticism of the government does not constitute grounds for preventive detention unless it poses a proximate threat to public order. Authorities in Kashmir routinely flout such court orders by resorting to ‘re-arrests’ under different legal provisions. Since 2018, at least 9 Kashmiri journalists have been subject to extended detention under the PSA, the UAPA and other criminal law provisions. Those still under incarceration without trial include Irfan Mehraj, a journalist associated with the Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society (JKCCS) who was arrested in March 2023.

In the first quarter of 2025, authorities in Uttar Pradesh’s Sambhal district continued their sweeping crackdown on the local Muslim community in the aftermath of the November 2024 police violence near the Shahi Jama Masjid, where five Muslim men were reportedly shot dead by police during protests against a controversial court-ordered mosque survey. At the time of writing, police had arrested at least 80 individuals in connection with the violence, in addition to registering eight FIRs naming 150 people and implicating a further 2500 unidentified persons.

Notable developments during the period under review included:

  • The arrest of mosque committee chairperson Zafar Ali on 25 March, a day before he was scheduled to testify before a judicial commission. Ali, who had publicly accused police officials of inciting the crowd and firing live ammunition during the November protests, was arrested and accused of criminal conspiracy and fabricating evidence. His associates alleged the arrest was intended to prevent him from testifying.
  • The arrest and public shaming of a Muslim youth on 12 March, for a social media post criticising Sambhal Circle Officer Anuj Chaudhary’s Islamophobic remarks ahead of the Holi festival. He was reportedly forced to record a video apology while in police custody. Chaudhary had earlier warned local Muslims to stay home if they did not wish to be coloured during Holi, sparking widespread condemnation. CM Adityanath expressed his support for Chaudhary’s remarks. Eyewitnesses have alleged that Chaudhary had played a key role in provoking and instigating the violence in November 2024 that resulted in five deaths.

Separately, media reports from February 2025 indicated that UP Police had named a Dubai-based Muslim ‘gangster’ as the alleged mastermind behind the violence, while simultaneously accusing two other Muslim men of murdering two of the five victims of the November 2024 shootings, whose families have alleged direct police culpability in their deaths.

Authorities also confirmed that nearly 1000 Muslim homes in Sambhal had remained locked since November, suggesting widespread displacement and fear among local Muslims. In early March, over a dozen local mosques were pre-emptively covered with tarpaulin sheets by police as part of ‘security measures’ ahead of Holi. These developments form part of a broader and ongoing crackdown in Sambhal since November 2024, marked by killings, arbitrary arrests, retaliatory evictions, suppression of witnesses, denial of access to services, and other coercive measures indiscriminately targeting Muslims.

During the period under review, authorities in BJP-governed states across the country continued the trend of disproportionately—and often exclusively—arresting Muslims in the aftermath of episodes of ‘communal’ violence, usually instigated by Hindu extremists, particularly around Hindu religious festivals. (See section on Torture and Ill-Treatment – Non-State Actors for more on these episodes.)

In the first quarter of 2025, such arrests were reported from:

  • Bihar, in the aftermath of communal violence linked to a Hindu procession in Jamui on 16 February. Media reports suggested that of eight arrests recorded, all were Muslims.
  • Madhya Pradesh, where at least 13 individuals were arrested after violence near a mosque in Mhow on 9 March. Of these, 12 were reportedly Muslim. Two Muslims were also booked under the draconian National Security Act, which provides for their preventive detention without trial for up to a year.
  • Maharashtra, where in the aftermath of violence in Nagpur on 17 March, authorities were reported to have arrested at least 105 people, the vast majority of them Muslims, including at least 10 minors. Six Muslims, including political leader Fahim Khan, were charged with sedition. Khan’s home was later partially demolished by local authorities. In contrast, eight Hindu nationalist activists who surrendered before police were granted speedy bail.

In 2024, we had similarly documented at least three waves of mass arrests of over 1000 Muslims as collective punishment in the aftermath of targeted mass violence episodes. See our 2024 Overview here.

During the period under review, authorities in BJP-governed states across the country continued to weaponise provincial-level anti-conversion and cow protection laws to criminalise the conduct of Muslim individuals. Notable cases included:

  • Discriminatory arrests of Muslims under anti-conversion (‘love jihad’) laws: In Uttar Pradesh, five Muslims, including a bride and her parents, were arrested in Bijnor district on 9 February under the state’s anti-conversion law after the Hindu father of a man who had converted to Islam and married a Muslim woman filed a complaint. In Hamirpur district on 10 January, five Muslim men were arrested following allegations by Bajrang Dal members that they had attempted to convert a Dalit family. In Bhopal (Madhya Pradesh), a Muslim man was arrested on 8 February after he and his Hindu partner were attacked by a Hindu mob while trying to register their marriage. And in Vijaynagar (Rajasthan), nine Muslim youths were arrested in February following pressure from Hindutva groups, who labelled their interactions with Hindu girls as part of a ‘love jihad’ conspiracy.

News reports also documented an emerging trend of Muslim women being targeted and arrested under these laws, for allegedly converting Dalit men on the pretext of marriage. Such arrests were reported from Fatehpur and Bijnor, both in Uttar Pradesh.

  • Discriminatory arrests of Muslims under cow protection laws: In Madhya Pradesh, multiple notable incidents were reported in March:  On 2 March, two Muslim men accused of cow slaughter were arrested and publicly paraded while being forced to chant humiliating slogans by police in Ujjain; later that day, members of Hindu extremist groups Bajrang Dal reportedly honoured the police with garlands. In a similar case, on 8 March, 11 Muslims accused of cow slaughter were publicly paraded to court by police in Damoh district, where lawyers tried to assault them inside court premises.

The cases highlighted above are non-exhaustive, and serve as further evidence of the continuing abuse of anti-conversion and cow protection laws to target vulnerable minorities, as well as of the nexus between local law enforcement and Hindu extremist groups. Arrests under these laws are routine and significantly underreported by the media. 

Anti-conversion laws, which also include newly-introduced/amended laws in several states that are framed as ‘love jihad’ laws aimed at criminalising inter-religious marriages, are now present in 12 of India’s 28 states, and continue to be abused to disproportionately target Muslims as well as Christians. Cow protection laws, present in 20 states, are used to disproportionately target poor Muslims as well as Hindus belonging to ‘lower’ castes. In some states, particularly Uttar Pradesh, local police have also used allegedly staged ‘encounter’ shootings to kill or maim individuals accused of involvement in cow-related crimes.

During the period under review, authorities in BJP-governed states across the country continued to weaponise provincial-level anti-conversion and cow protection laws to criminalise the conduct of Muslim individuals. Notable cases included:

  • Arbitrary arrests of two prominent government critics in Assam: In Assam, the BJP’s Himanta Biswa Sarma-led government continued its crackdown on critics and opposition voices. On 23 February, Mahbubul Hoque, the chancellor of a private university, was arrested in connection with alleged exam malpractice at a school run by his foundation. Hoque has been the subject of sustained targeting by Sarma, including over accusations of ‘flood jihad’. Separately, on 25 March, journalist Dilwar Hussain Mozumder was arrested in Guwahati while attempting to report on alleged irregularities involving a bank linked to the Chief Minister. Mozumder faced two successive arrests and was only released after sustained protests by press associations.
  • Arbitrary detention of a Muslim boy and his family Maharashtra over alleged ‘anti-India’ slogans: In Malvan (Maharashtra), on 25 February, the parents of a minor Muslim boy were arrested after allegations surfaced that the child had shouted ‘anti-India’ slogans during celebrations following India’s cricket victory over Pakistan. The boy was sent to an observation home. The local Bar Association reportedly decided to deny legal representation to the family. A scrap shop owned by the family was later demolished by municipality authorities.
  • Arbitrary arrests of 20+ Muslims in Uttar Pradesh for expression of religious or political identity: On 1 April, several Muslim youths in Saharanpur were arrested for waving Palestinian flags and chanting slogans during Eid prayers; their families alleged warrantless night-time raids at their homes. In Mirzapur, a Muslim man was arrested and booked for sedition after appearing in a religious video with a Pakistani cleric. In Meerut on 13 March, a Muslim student was arrested and suspended for offering prayers on campus. On 19 January in Bareilly, four Muslim men were arrested for offering prayers on private property without prior permission. On 7 March in Rampur, nine Muslims, including a cleric, were arrested for announcing iftar (fast-breaking time) via loudspeaker. 
  • Arbitrary arrests of 19 Muslims in Maharashtra following BJP leader’s false claims of ‘illegal immigrants’: In January, BJP leader Kirit Somaiya alleged, without evidence, that thousands of ‘Rohingya and Bangladeshi’ Muslims were illegally residing in Malegaon. Maharashtra’s BJP-led government promptly formed a Special Investigation Team (SIT), which went on to summon hundreds and arrest 19 individuals on document-related charges. None were found to be undocumented foreigners. Residents and legal advocates alleged that the campaign amounted to collective punishment of a Muslim-majority town that had voted against the BJP in the 2024 General Election.

Also during the period under review, the Supreme Court ordered the Assam government to initiate the deportation of 63 individuals previously detained at the Matia detention camp in Goalpara district, asserting that they are ‘exclusively Bangladeshi citizens’. Families of the detainees vehemently assert that they are Indian citizens with longstanding ties to Assam.   Separately, Rohingya Muslim refugees to India from Myanmar continued to face indefinite detention, despite holding UNHCR refugee cards. Over 600 detainees, including children, pregnant women, and elderly individuals, are reported to be held in detention centres without charges or ongoing legal cases. Reports have continued to highlight overcrowding, lack of sanitation, family separations, and absence of legal and mental health support in these detention centres across the country.


The cases highlighted above raise serious concerns under international human rights law relating to the prohibition of arbitrary detention and the rights to liberty, equality before the law, and due process. Many of the arrests described above were carried out without credible legal basis, in a discriminatory manner, or in reprisal for the peaceful exercise of protected rights. These patterns are exacerbated by routine violations of procedural safeguards, including prolonged pre-trial detention, denial of legal representation, and the use of intimidation and public humiliation.

  • A new study by India Hate Lab documented 1,165 instances of hate speech targeting religious minorities in India in 2024, a 74% increase from 2023.

    Of these, 98.5% (1,147 incidents) targeted Muslims, either explicitly (1,050) or alongside Christians (97). 79.9% of all hate speech events occurred in BJP-ruled states or Union Territories, with Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Madhya Pradesh collectively accounting for nearly half of all recorded events. Notably, six of the ten most frequent purveyors of hate speech were BJP politicians, including Prime Minister Narendra Modi (67 incidents) and UP CM Adityanath (86 incidents).

    The study found that hate speech was most often disseminated during political rallies, electoral campaigns, and religious processions, and amplified through social media. It concluded that such speech was not incidental but had become a ‘standard feature’ of Indian political culture and electoral campaigns

    Questioned about the report in Parliament, India’s Minority Affairs minister responded that it is state-level governments that are responsible for tackling hate speech crimes via their law enforcement agencies. (At the time of writing, 19 of India’s 28 states, including those with the highest hate speech incidence, are under the control of BJP-led governments.)

  • During the period under review (January – March 2025), the same trends highlighted by India Hate Lab continued unfettered, as India witnessed escalated levels of ‘top’ and ‘intermediate’ level hate speech targeted at religious minorities.  (‘Top’ level hate speech is prohibited by international law, constituting direct incitement to hostility, discrimination, or violence; ‘Intermediate’ level hate speech may be prohibited by states—and are prohibited by India—to protect the rights or reputations of others, or for the protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or morals. See UN guidance here.)
  • The campaign for the February 2025 Legislative Assembly election in national capital Delhi provided the pretext for yet another spike in anti-Muslim hate speech at political rallies. Senior BJP leaders continued using the same rhetoric deployed by PM Modi during the 2024 General Elections (and subsequent state elections in November 2024), referring to Muslims as ‘infiltrators’ and other pejoratives. Rohingya Muslim refugees from Myanmar to India, many of whom are located in Delhi, became primary scapegoats, as both the BJP and the main regional opposition party AAP attempted to outdo each other in xenophobic posturing. BJP leaders pledged to deport all Rohingya, while Delhi’s AAP government issued orders barring Rohingya children from public schools.

    The BJP subsequently swept the election and formed a government in the state. Rekha Gupta, a BJP leader who had previously questioned Muslims’ loyalty to India, was sworn in as Chief Minister. Two local leaders who were accused of inciting and participating in anti-Muslim  mass violence in February 2020, Kapil Mishra and Parvesh Verma, joined the government as Cabinet Ministers. Ravinder Singh Negi, a former local councillor who continues to spearhead a harassment campaign against Muslim shopkeepers in East Delhi, was elected as a Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA).

  • Chief Ministers (CMs) of many BJP-governed states, including those where the largest numbers of India’s Muslims reside, continued to keep their crosshairs fixed on Muslims, targeting them via hateful rhetoric as well as discriminatory policies and actions. UP CM Adityanath, while speaking in the state assembly, referred to Muslims using a religious slur, and denigrated Urdu, a language deeply associated with northern Indian Muslim identity, as a language of fanatics. Assam CM Himanta Biswa Sarma urged tribals to rear more pigs, apparently to keep Muslims from grabbing their land. Uttarakhand CM Pushkar Singh Dhami continued to spread unfounded claims about Muslims engaging in conspiracies like ‘love jihad’, ‘land jihad’, and ‘spit jihad’.
  • Other senior BJP leaders, including state ministers and elected MLAs, continued to make public remarks targeting Muslims:
NameDescription
Nitesh Rane  
(Cabinet Minister, Maharashtra)		Rane, a prolific hate speech offender who was promoted as a Cabinet Minister following the BJP’s state election victory in Maharashtra last year, continued to make anti-Muslim speeches throughout the period under review. He repeatedly referred to Muslims as ‘green snakes’ and other pejorative references. In late-February, after a local official overturned an illegal resolution by a village panchayat banning Muslim traders, Rane expressed his support for such a ban. In mid-February, a Muslim businessman in Sidhuburgh district alleged that his home and shops were illegally demolished by local authorities after receiving direct orders from Rane.
Ashok Singhal  
(Health Minister, Assam)  
5 March, 2025		Speaking at a public meeting, Singhal stated that ‘Miya’ Muslims should be barred from operating shops during Hindu festivals, and encouraged his constituents to avoid mingling with them.
Gopal Sharma  
(BJP MLA, Rajasthan)  
7 March, 2025		During a state assembly session, Sharma repeatedly referred to opposition MLA Rafeek Khan as a ‘Pakistani’
Ketaki Singh  
(BJP MLA, Uttar Pradesh)  
10 March, 2025		Singh demanded a separate medical college wing for Muslims, claiming Hindus feared that their food would be contaminated by Muslims.
Suvendu Adhikari
(BJP MLA and Leader of Opposition, West Bengal)  
12 March, 2025		While addressing reporters, Adhikari claimed that the BJP would physically pick and throw all Muslim elected MLAs of the Trinamool Congress (the governing party in West Bengal) out, if the BJP wins state elections in 2026.
Asha Nautiyal  
(BJP MLA, Uttarakhand)		Nautiyal called for the banning of non-Hindus from Kedarnath and other holy Hindu sites, claiming that non-Hindus are ‘hurting religious sentiments’.  
Amit Shah*
(BJP MLA, Gujarat) and others  

*not to be confused with Union Home Minister Amit Shah		Imran Khedawala, the only Muslim MLA in Gujarat state, alleged to the Speaker of the state assembly that he faced repeated Islamophobic comments from Shah and other BJP leaders.
  • The 2025 Kumbh Mela, a major Hindu pilgrimage festival held in Prayagraj (Uttar Pradesh) in January, provided the pretext for a ‘hate speech avalanche’ against Muslims. At a parallel gathering of Hindu religious leaders convened during the Mela, several prominent speakers openly propagated hate speech. BJP MLA T. Raja Singh invoked conspiracy theories about ‘love jihad’ and ‘land jihad’, and praised convicted murder of Christians Dara Singh as a ‘warrior’.  Another prominent speaker Sadhvi Prachi, who leads extremist outfit Bhagwa Kranti Sena, propagated false conspiracy theories about Hindus being at risk of demographic overhaul by Muslims. Such hate speech events continued unabated in public rallies and events across the country, particularly in states like Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Madhya Pradesh, Assam, and Gujarat, among others. Most of these hate rallies and events were organised by BJP allies operating under the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) ecosystem, such as the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and its youth wing Bajrang Dal, as well as other, localised Hindu extremist groups. Speakers at these events included influential figures such as Yati Narsinghanand Saraswati (who, on 23 January, boasted about ‘shedding blood’ to help Modi and Adityanath attain power), Kajal Shingala, and Suresh Chavhanke, who continued to openly and directly incite hostility, discrimination or violence towards Muslims.
  • Concerningly, even hate speech by members of the higher judiciary remained unaddressed. In Uttar Pradesh, Justice Shekhar Kumar Yadav, a High Court judge who had courted controversy late last year by attending an event organised by VHP, continued to serve on the bench. At the event, Yadav had referred to Muslims using Islamophobic slurs, and stated that India would ‘function as per the wishes of the majority’. Another judge, Justice Rohit Ranjan Agarwal, who had last year made unfounded claims that unlawful conversions were taking place at a ‘rampant pace’ and that India’s majority was at risk of turning into a minority, also continues to serve on the High Court bench in UP.

  • Repeat hate speech offenders, at all levels, continued to evade accountability. In early April, a court order to finally register an FIR against Kapil Mishra, the newly-appointed Cabinet Minister in Delhi who had popularised the ‘shoot the traitors’ slogan against Muslims in 2019-20, was stayed upon the request of Delhi Police.  In January, Sadhvi Ritambhara, a prominent Hindu hate preacher with a decades-long history of inciting anti-Muslim and anti-Christian hatred, was awarded India’s third-highest civilian honour. And the Indian Supreme Court’s directives in 2023 to all state governments to take suo motu action in hate speech cases remained unheeded across the country. (A rare instance of the directive being followed was reported from Kerala, an opposition-ruled state, where senior BJP leader PC George was arrested and briefly remanded, before he secured bail on health reasons; in a television debate, George had allegedly referred to Muslims as terrorists and propounded the discredited ‘love jihad’ conspiracy theory.)

During the period under review, the BJP-led central government introduced sweeping legislative changes that could undermine the autonomy of Muslim religious endowments across India. In parallel, several BJP-governed states took further steps that raised serious concerns over religious freedom, including Gujarat’s move to draft a Uniform Civil Code, the continued weaponisation of anti-conversion laws against Muslims and Christians across India, and restrictions on public religious observance by Muslims during Ramadan. At the same time, Hindu extremist non-state actors continued to violently target minority religious sites during episodes of mass violence.

IIn early April, India’s Parliament passed the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025, over strong opposition protest, bringing sweeping changes to the governance of Muslim religious endowments.  While Prime Minister Narendra Modi hailed the enactment as a ‘watershed moment’,  Muslim organisations, opposition parties, and legal experts described the legislation as a serious threat to minority rights and religious freedom.

Waqfs are religious or charitable endowments under Islamic law, typically involving the permanent dedication of property for the benefit of the Muslim community; once established, waqf properties cannot be sold or repurposed for non-religious use. Each Indian state has a Waqf Board responsible for managing such properties.

The new Act introduces changes that significantly curtail the autonomy of Muslim communities in managing these endowments. Among the most contentious provisions is the abolition of ‘waqf by use’, a doctrine that previously allowed mosques, graveyards, and shrines to be recognised as waqf based on historical community usage even without formal deeds, a move that now puts undocumented heritage sites at risk of state takeover. The Act also permits the inclusion of non-Muslims on Waqf Boards, an unprecedented step not applied to other religious communities and seen by critics as undermining the constitutional guarantee that all religious denominations have the right to manage their own religious affairs. Under the Act, decision-making power over property disputes is shifted to state-appointed officials like the District Collector, effectively making the state a judge in cases where it may itself claim the land. The Act centralises control by empowering the central government to issue binding regulations, conduct audits, and restructure Waqf Boards.

The Act was cleared after a Joint Parliamentary Committee rejected all 44 suggestions it had received from Opposition members. Several Muslim organisations and opposition parties have approached the Supreme Court challenging its constitutionality. In Uttar Pradesh, despite no reported disruption or violence, more than 300 Muslims in Muzaffarnagar were issued notices requiring ‘peace bonds’ after they silently protested the Act by wearing black armbands during Friday prayers on 28 March. Further protests are expected.

In early February, the Gujarat government announced the formation of a five-member committee to draft a Uniform Civil Code (UCC) for the state, becoming the second BJP-ruled state, after Uttarakhand, to take formal steps toward implementing a common personal law framework for all religions.

The panel, led by a retired Supreme Court Judge who had also led a similar panel in Uttarakhand, was instructed to submit its report within 45 days. Chief Minister Bhupendra Patel framed the move as a step toward equality, declaring: ‘Indianness is our religion, and the Constitution is our sacred text.’ (‘Indianness’ is not acknowledged as a religion anywhere in Indian law, which formally recognises Buddhists, Christians, Jains, Muslims, Sikhs and Zoroastrians as religious minority communities. Further, the Constitution guarantees religious freedom as well as minority rights as fundamental rights.)

Patel’s announcement came shortly after Uttarakhand implemented its UCC on 27 January, the first such law passed since Indian independence. Days later, during a Rajya Sabha session on 6 February, Prime Minister Narendra Modi defended the concept of a national UCC, claiming it reflected the original intentions of the Constitution’s framers, and that it would ‘strengthen democracy.’

While proponents have positioned the UCC as a tool for ensuring gender equality and national integration, critics have warned that such laws would disproportionately impact religious minorities. Legal experts and opposition parties have raised concerns that the draft codes may erase or dilute Muslim personal law and other minority traditions by drawing disproportionately from Hindu legal norms. These concerns are heightened by the broader political context in which the UCC is being pursued, with community leaders and rights groups cautioning that the reform process risks further entrenching Hindu majoritarianism and a patriarchal approach to personal law reform.

During the period under review, multiple BJP-governed states escalated their use of anti-conversion laws—dubbed ‘love jihad’ laws in states that have recently sought to criminalise inter-religious marriages—to criminalise and incarcerate Muslims and Christians. These provincial-level statutes, now in effect in 12 states, claim to prohibit conversions by force, fraud, and other unlawful means, but are widely criticised for undermining religious freedom and enabling the arbitrary suppression of minorities’ legitimate religious activity.

  • Uttar Pradesh: In January, a special court in Ambedkar Nagar sentenced a Christian couple to five years in prison, after convicting them of attempting to convert Dalit villagers through religious discussion, Bible distribution, and the organisation of Christian gatherings. In a separate and emerging trend, police registered new cases in Fatehpur and Bijnor accusing Muslim women, rather than men as is usual, of coercing Hindu Dalit men into converting to Islam under the pretext of marriage, marking a shift in the traditional ‘love jihad’ narrative.
  • Arunachal Pradesh: In Arunachal Pradesh, thousands of Christians protested the government’s plan to revive the long-dormant anti-conversion law in the state. The state High Court had directed the government in September 2024 to frame draft rules for the implementation of the law, after hearing a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) that had cited the need to preserve ‘indigenous tribal faiths’. The Arunachal Pradesh Freedom of Religion Act was passed in 1978, but is yet to be implemented in the state, where Christianity (at 30.26%) was the most-followed religion as of 2011.
  • Rajasthan: In Rajasthan, the state government introduced its own anti-conversion bill, with provisions that also criminalise conversions related to marriage. While retaining provisions similar to those in other recently introduced or amended anti-conversion laws, Rajasthan’s proposed law seeks to provide legal immunity to officials for actions taken ‘in good faith’ while enforcing the law, raising concerns about potential arbitrariness.
  • Madhya Pradesh: In Madhya Pradesh, Chief Minister Mohan Yadav announced plans to amend the state’s anti-conversion law to introduce the death penalty for forced conversions involving women. The proposed change could make Madhya Pradesh the first Indian state to impose capital punishment for religious conversion. In 2024, neighbouring Uttar Pradesh had amended its anti-conversion law to increase the maximum penalty to life imprisonment.

These developments raise serious concerns about violations of the freedom of religion or belief, the right to privacy, and the right to equality and non-discrimination. Mandatory disclosures, surveillance of interfaith relationships, and disproportionate penalties, including the proposed death penalty in Madhya Pradesh, undermine basic rights and heighten the risk of targeted harassment. Across BJP-governed states, the use of anti-conversion laws appears increasingly designed to stigmatise and punish minority religious communities. (Also see the section on Arrests and Detentions for more on recent arrests under these laws.)

During the period under review, several BJP-governed states imposed restrictions or issued directives that curtailed the public manifestation of faith by Muslims, particularly around Ramadan.

  • Uttar Pradesh: In the lead-up to Eid-ul-Fitr (31 March), police in multiple districts issued strict directives prohibiting prayers in public spaces or on rooftops. Authorities in Meerut warned that individuals defying the orders could face cancellation of their passports and driving licences. Enhanced surveillance, including drone monitoring and heavy police deployment, was introduced in Muslim-majority areas. In Sambhal too, where Muslims have faced a systematic crackdown since the police shootings that had left 5 Muslims dead in November 2024, similar restrictions were applied along with bans on the use of loudspeakers at mosques. Around the same time, police ordered dozens of mosques to be covered with tarpaulins ahead of Holi celebrations, prompting concern over symbolic targeting of Islamic religious sites. On 14 March, a police officer in Sambhal advised Muslims to remain indoors during Holi if they did not wish to be coloured, suggesting that Friday prayers occurred weekly whereas Holi was a rare Hindu festival. Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath defended the remarks, calling them ‘truthful’ and asking people to accept them. A senior BJP leader later proposed that Muslim men wear ‘tarpaulin hijabs’ to avoid being coloured during Holi, suggesting it was unrealistic to expect Hindus to refrain from celebrations near mosques. Later, authorities in Sambhal banned the Neja Mela, a centuries-old annual fair held by the local Muslim community to commemorate an 11th-century Islamic figure revered by many as a saint. The denial of permission was issued on the grounds that the fair honoured an ‘invader’, ‘plunderer’, and ‘murderer’, with Sambhal’s Additional Superintendent of Police (ASP) calling the practice ‘anti-national’ and a ‘malpractice’.
  • Bihar: On 10 March, a BJP MLA stated that Muslims who objected to being smeared with colours during Holi should stay indoors, echoing statements by senior state officials in neighbouring Uttar Pradesh.
  • Haryana: The state government reclassified Eid as a restricted rather than gazetted holiday in 2025. Under this change, Muslim government employees were required to apply for individual leave to observe the festival, departing from the long-standing practice of officially recognising major religious holidays across communities.

In Jammu and Kashmir, where the central government retains control over law and order despite the conclusion last year of the first legislative assembly election in over a decade, the Jamia Masjid in Srinagar was once again closed by authorities on Shab-e-Baraat (Night of Forgiveness, a significant night in the Islamic calendar), as well as on Eid-ul-Fitr. This marked the sixth consecutive year that authorities barred access to the mosque during these events. Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, the mosque’s chief cleric, was placed under house detention, and worshippers were removed from the premises.

As highlighted in other sections, Ramadan and Holi were also marked by an uptick in anti-Muslim violence, including the lynching of a man in Uttar Pradesh. See Deprivation of Life (Non-State Actors) and Torture and Ill-Treatment (Non-State Actors).


The developments highlighted above raise serious concerns under international human rights law as well as domestic constitutional guarantees relating to religious freedom. The right to adopt, change, and manifest one’s religion, including the freedom to worship in public, is a core human right that is to be protected without discrimination or coercion. The measures outlined above appear to unduly limit this freedom.

Also during the period under review, Hindu extremists continue to target Muslim religious sites during episodes of targeted mass violence (see section on Torture and Ill-Treatment (Non-State Actors).) On 30 March, 2025, a low-intensity blast caused structural damage to a mosque in Beed district (Maharashtra), on the eve of Eid-ul-Fitr. While no injuries were reported, the explosion caused visible damage to the interior of the mosque. On March 12 in Ratnagiri (Maharashtra), a mob of Hindu devotees celebrating the Shimga festival forced their way into Jama Masjid by ramming its gate with a large wooden structure, while police stood by without intervening. These attacks, while resulting in no injuries, highlight the persistent vulnerability of minority religious sites to targeted acts of hostility by Hindu extremists.

During the period under review, BJP-ruled governments continued to discriminate against Muslims in access to housing, education, livelihoods, and cultural life. This included punitive demolitions and evictions in defiance of Supreme Court directives; a state-wide crackdown on Islamic madrassas in Uttarakhand; repeated targeting of Muslim meat and food businesses under the guise of Hindu religious observance; and the intensification of other efforts to culturally marginalise Muslims. Alongside, budgetary allocations at both central and state levels continued to systematically deprioritise minorities.

During the period under review, authorities in several BJP-governed states continued to carry out demolitions and evictions that either explicitly punished Muslims accused of wrongdoing or disproportionately impacted Muslim communities. These actions continued despite Supreme Court guidelines issued in November 2024, which required that all demolitions follow due process, including advance notice, opportunity for hearing, and legal justification.

A February 2025 report by Frontline found that over 7,400 homes were demolished across India in 2024, rendering more than 41,000 people homeless. Uttar Pradesh alone accounted for 30% of these demolitions. Nationally, 37% of demolitions reportedly targeted Muslims. Around 75% were carried out in the name of ‘redevelopment’, often targeting Muslim-majority slums, while Hindu-majority areas were more likely to receive in-situ upgrades, according to the report. The report also found that at least 25% of all demolitions were explicitly punitive in nature, and that almost all punitive demolitions were targeted at Muslims.

Apparently punitive demolitions of property in the first quarter of 2025 included:

  • 20-21 February, 2025 (Bijaynagar, Rajasthan): Following the arrest of 10 Muslims, including three minors, for allegedly sexually assaulting and blackmailing five Hindu schoolgirls, municipal authorities issued demolition-related notices to the families of the accused, a local mosque, and a graveyard. Hindutva groups had called for ‘bulldozer action’ and framed the case as ‘love jihad.’ On 6 March, the Rajasthan High Court ordered a status quo, barring the municipality from carrying out demolitions linked to the case and citing non-compliance with SC guidelines.
  • 24 February, 2025 (Malvan, Maharashtra): Authorities demolished the home and business of a Muslim family after their son was accused of chanting ‘anti-national’ slogans after an India-Pakistan cricket match. According to a contempt petition filed in the Supreme Court, the demolition was carried out without prior notice and under political pressure, directly violating the SC’s guidelines. The petitioner alleged that the FIR against the family was based on false claims and that the demolition followed a letter from a local BJP MLA demanding action.
  • 7-11 March, 2025 (Damoh, Madhya Pradesh): Following allegations of cow slaughter, authorities demolished several structures belonging to members of the Muslim Qasai (butcher) community in the Sitabaoli area and announced plans to bulldoze over 300 more homes before Holi. The demolitions were reportedly carried out under pressure from Hindutva groups, who demanded action after communal tensions escalated. Notices were served to residents, giving them only three days to vacate. Officials described the targeted structures as encroachments, and stated that the demolition drive would continue.
  • 15 March, 2025 (Ahmedabad, Gujarat):  Municipal authorities demolished the homes of six Muslim individuals who had been arrested in connection with a mob attack in the Vastral locality. The demolitions took place in Amraiwadi and Khokhar under heavy police presence, reportedly involving 700–800 personnel. The police claimed the homes were ‘illegally constructed’. The demolitions occurred shortly after the individuals’ arrests and amid a broader directive from Gujarat’s Director General of Police to act against ‘anti-social elements.’
  • 25 March, 2025 (Nagpur, Maharashtra): In the aftermath of communal violence in Nagpur on 17 March, the home of Fahim Khan, a Muslim political leader accused by police of sedition and misinformation, was bulldozed by municipal authorities. The Bombay High Court stayed further demolitions the same day, criticising the civic body’s ‘high-handedness’ and observing prima facie violation of SC guidelines. Notices had also been issued to another accused, whose family alleged the demolition was retaliatory despite possessing legal ownership documents.

Other demolition drives that seemed to disproportionately impact Muslims included:

  • 13-17 January, 2025 (Bet Dwarka, Gujarat): Authorities demolished over 330 structures in Balapar village during a week-long drive, including 314 homes, 9 commercial buildings, and 12 religious structures, amid heavy police deployment. While the Gujarat government claimed the action targeted illegal encroachments, Muslim community leaders alleged that Muslim properties were disproportionately affected.
  • 13 January, 2025 (Ujjain, Madhya Pradesh): As part of a temple corridor expansion, authorities demolished the Takiya mosque and 257 homes in Nizamuddin Colony, a predominantly Muslim area. Residents reported receiving less than 12 hours’ notice before the demolition began at dawn under heavy police deployment. While officials claimed compensation had been offered, displaced families expressed distress over the abrupt and forceful evictions.
  • 22 January, 2025 (Surguja, Chhattisgarh): Around 60 homes belonging to Muslim migrant workers were demolished forest authorities on allegations of encroachment, three days after the state’s Forest Minister called for their removal. Locals alleged that while the area housed people from multiple communities, only Muslim homes were targeted, leaving dozens of families homeless in the winter.
  • 8 February onwards, 2025 (Pune, Maharashtra): In a sweeping ‘anti-encroachment’ drive, municipal authorities demolished over 5,000 shops and warehouses across several neighbourhoods. Many of the affected business owners, reportedly from the Muslim community, alleged they received no prior notice, and that the drive has left thousands of Muslims jobless.
  • 22 February, 2025 (Gomtipur, Ahmedabad, Gujarat): Municipal authorities demolished 160 structures, including homes, shops, and two religious sites, in the Muslim-majority locality of Gomtipur, citing road widening as the reason. Local councillor Iqbal Sheikh alleged that demolitions were carried out without prior notice and that residents who protested were detained. Affected families, many of them low-income, expressed distress over being left homeless just weeks before Ramadan.
  • 21 March, 2025 (Kushinagar, Uttar Pradesh): Authorities issued an eviction notice ordering the demolition of the Gadhiya Masjid, its adjoining madrasa, and an idgah, citing alleged encroachment. The notice, based on a 27 January local Court order, directed removal by 8 April, warning of bulldozer action if not complied with. While the local administration claimed it was acting per legal orders, community leaders questioned why only Muslim structures were being targeted.
  • 25 March, 2025 (Gurugram, Haryana): Authorities demolished around 300 makeshift homes of Bengali-speaking migrant workers in Sector-39, allegedly without prior notice. Many of the affected workers, originally from districts in West Bengal, claimed they were targeted on suspicions of being ‘Bangladeshi’ due to their language. While officials cited illegal encroachment and court orders, displaced residents denied receiving any formal notice and said they had been renting the land. The demolitions left hundreds homeless just days before Eid.

These cases, while not exhaustive, underscore the continued defiance by BJP-governed states of the SC’s November 2024 directives. On 5 March, the Court strongly condemned the Uttar Pradesh government’s illegal demolition of six homes in Prayagraj without following due process, and ordered it to pay ₹10 lakh (~$11,900) each in compensation to the house owners. Calling the action ‘shocking’ and ‘high-handed’, the bench also ordered that the structures be rebuilt and refused to send the matter back to the state High Court. Yet, despite this clear judicial reprimand, similar demolitions and threats of eviction continue with impunity, highlighting the limited deterrent effect of the Court’s interventions to date.

In March 2025, the BJP-led Uttarakhand government sealed 136 Islamic madrassas as part of an ongoing crackdown on allegedly unregistered institutions. Officials claimed the closures targeted madrassas not recognised by the education department or Madrasa Board, particularly in border areas, citing security concerns. The state estimates 450 registered madrassas and over 500 unregistered ones.

The drive has drawn strong criticism from Muslim leaders and civil society groups, who allege the action is discriminatory and politically motivated. Several institutions reportedly received no prior notice, and even small makhtabs (informal evening Quran classes not requiring registration) were reportedly sealed. The crackdown came during Ramadan, when many students were away on break.

Madrassas serve as a crucial source of primary education for many Muslim children, particularly from poor families who lack access to functioning government schools. Parents, teachers, and community leaders described the closures as ‘devastating’, not only cutting off religious instruction but also depriving children of basic literacy and meals. Critics also pointed to the state’s own failings: hundreds of government schools in Uttarakhand lack teachers or principals, raising doubts about the state’s capacity to absorb displaced students. Legal challenges have now reached the Supreme Court.

In several BJP-governed states, local and state authorities continued to impose restrictions on eateries, disproportionately affecting Muslim-owned businesses.

In Uttar Pradesh, the government banned the sale of meat within 500 metres of religious sites during Navratri and ordered a complete shutdown of meat shops on Ram Navami (6 April). Implementation was overseen by district-level committees with wide-ranging powers. Similar closures were enforced in Varanasi, where 10 Muslim meat shop owners were charged for violating a municipal ban near the Kashi Vishwanath temple.

In Delhi, BJP MLA Ravinder Negi demanded city-wide closure of meat shops during Navratri, citing ‘religious sentiments’. He also called on Hindu street vendors to display saffron flags.

In Madhya Pradesh, the state government implemented a blanket liquor ban in 19 religious towns from 1 April, building on earlier restrictions on open meat and egg sales in areas considered sacred by Hindus. Officials claimed the move was driven by ‘public faith’ and a push for de-addiction.

In Maharashtra, state Cabinet Minister Nitesh Rane promoted a controversial ‘Malhar Certification’ to promote Hindu-owned ‘jhatka’ (non-halal) meat shops. While not a government scheme, Rane urged Hindus to patronise only those certified, explicitly advising them to ‘not even look’ at other establishments.

In Gujarat, Muslim dhaba owners alleged discriminatory exclusion from the official list of food establishments licensed by the state transport authority (GSRTC) to operate along bus routes. While officials denied discrimination, no transparent selection criteria were provided, and some applicants said they were removed from the list based on ‘instructions from above.’ In 2024, BJP governments in Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand had announced policy measures giving credence to ‘spit jihad’, an unfounded conspiracy theory alleging an organised plot by Muslims to endanger Hindus by contaminating their food. Such actions, and the recent moves highlighted above, are the continuation of a pattern of using religious justifications to restrict economic activity by Muslim traders, in ways that infringe upon their rights to work, equal treatment, and non-discrimination.

On 22 February, the gram panchayat of Madhi village in Maharashtra’s Pathardi taluka passed a resolution banning Muslim traders from setting up stalls during the Madhi Chi Yatra, a Hindu religious festival.

The order, widely condemned as discriminatory, was later stayed by the local Block Development Officer (BDO), who found it ‘unconstitutional’ due to lack of quorum, unverifiable signatures, and other procedural flaws.

Despite the stay, state Cabinet Minister Nitesh Rane defended the resolution and urged villagers to pass the ‘historic’ resolution again, claiming it reflected the will of ‘hardcore Hindutva supporters.’.

During the period under review, a range of actions by BJP-led governments signalled an intensification of efforts to marginalise India’s Muslims from public and cultural life.

In Uttar Pradesh, Chief Minister Adityanath sparked outrage by denigrating Urdu, a language closely linked to northern Indian Muslim identity, in the state assembly, equating support for the language with efforts to push the country toward ‘fanaticism. Urdu is a constitutionally recognised language across India, and one of the two official languages of state administration in Uttar Pradesh.

In neighbouring Bihar, a school principal and teacher were abruptly transferred following a controversy over Urdu-language prayers. The incident escalated when a teacher filmed the prayers and confronted local villagers, who accused him of ‘introducing new traditions’ and made molestation allegations. Despite the lack of evidence, both he and the school’s Muslim principal were removed, reinforcing fears that any expression of Muslim cultural or religious identity risks triggering disproportionate repercussions.

In February, Uttar Pradesh authorities renamed a government school in Ghazipur district, previously named after Muslim war hero Abdul Hamid,  to ‘PM Shri Composite School’. Although the decision was reversed after public backlash, it was viewed as part of a wider pattern in BJP-ruled states to erase Muslim names from public institutions. In March alone, Madhya Pradesh renamed 11 Muslim-named villages, and Uttarakhand announced the renaming of 18 places, replacing names like Mohammadpur, Aurangzebpur, and Pirwala with references to Hindu or RSS-associated figures. Delhi BJP MLAs also proposed renaming localities such as Mustafabad and Najafgarh, while using the legislative floor to frame such moves as cultural corrections.

Cultural erasure also took more subtle institutional forms. In Assam, the state Assembly formally scrapped the Friday namaz break, a 90-year-old tradition for Muslim legislators. In Haryana, the BJP government downgraded Eid-ul-Fitr from a gazetted to a restricted holiday. These measures, while varied in form and intensity, collectively contribute to an atmosphere where Muslim cultural visibility is treated with hostility.

Budgetary allocations announced during the period under review by the central government and several BJP-ruled states once again reflected the systematic marginalisation of minority communities, particularly Muslims, in development and welfare schemes.

The central government’s 2024–25 Budget saw further reductions to allocations to the already diminished Ministry of Minority Affairs (MoMA). Funding for the pre-matric scholarship scheme, once a key pillar of educational support for poor Muslim students, remained suspended for classes 1 to 8 for the second year in a row. For Classes 9 and 10, the allocation was slashed by nearly 85% compared to 2022–23. The merit-cum-means scholarship scheme for professional and technical courses, once MoMA’s flagship programme, was allocated just ₹30 crore (~$3.6 million), down from ₹365 crore in 2019–20 (~$51 million). Funding for the Maulana Azad Education Foundation, a long-standing grant-making body for Muslim girls’ education, remained at zero for the second year running.

This systematic marginalisation is not limited to the central level. The Uttar Pradesh government similarly slashed minority-focused schemes. The UP budget for 2024–25 shows a significant drop in allocations for madrasa modernisation, scholarships, and skill training programmes targeted at Muslims. Meanwhile, the state allocated ₹2000 crore for cow welfare (~$239 million) and ₹900 crore (~$108 million) for religious tourism initiatives.

A new report published by the Centre for Development Policy and Practice provided further evidence that Muslims, particularly in Uttar Pradesh, fare significantly worse than Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes on multiple indicators of educational and economic advancement, yet remain excluded from most affirmative action schemes. The report further noted that Muslim youth face a structural disadvantage in accessing opportunities.


The cases and patterns highlighted above raise serious concerns under international human rights law, particularly the ICESCR, which obliges states to progressively realise economic, social, and cultural rights to the maximum of their available resources, while ensuring at least minimum core levels of each right. Systematic cuts to minority welfare, punitive demolitions, and restrictions on Muslim livelihoods and cultural expression suggest not only a failure to meet these obligations, but active regression. Taken together, these actions amount to both direct and indirect discrimination, and also appear to violate the ICCPR’s protections for religious minorities to practise their culture, religion, and language in community with others.

During the period under review, multiple instances were reported of Hindu extremist groups targeting schools and students for organising or allegedly promoting Muslim cultural and religious expression.

In Himachal Pradesh, a private school in Shimla cancelled an Eid celebration planned for young children after receiving threats from local Hindu extremist groups, who accused it of promoting Islam. The event was described by the school as non-religious, voluntary, and similar to its Holi, Diwali, and Christmas activities. The school cancelled the event citing student safety.

In a similar incident in Uttarakhand, Bajrang Dal workers stormed a college in Haridwar on 9 March, protesting an Iftar party reportedly held by Muslim students a day earlier. Citing municipal bylaws and claiming Haridwar is a ‘Hindu religious city,’ the group labelled the event an ‘Islamic jihad conspiracy’ and demanded the expulsion of the students involved. Police intervened to defuse tensions.

Alongside, Hindu extremist groups across India continued to call for the social and economic boycott of Muslims. These calls were routinely made at hate speech events and public rallies, often accompanied by threats or violence. (See section on Advocacy of Religious Hatred.)

As referred to throughout previous sections, India’s domestic mechanisms continued to largely fail to ensure accountability for ongoing and previous violations. The judicial process continued to be skewed towards powerful Hindu nationalist interests, and against minorities. Victims and families seeking justice were routinely harassed and intimidated. And even when India’s courts, including the Supreme Court, have attempted to step in, a sense of permissiveness and impunity has continued to prevail among State and non-State actors accused of violations. The following is a brief overview of recent reports and developments that underscore this lack of effective remedy.

The following is a brief overview of recent reports and developments that underscore this lack of effective remedy:

A new investigation by The Caravan shed light on the secretive Indian Army inquiry into the 22 December 2023 torture and killing of Muslim civilians in Jammu & Kashmir. The incident, which occurred in the Poonch-Rajouri region, involved the abduction and torture of at least 26 Muslim men by the Army’s Rashtriya Rifles units across five villages. Three men, all from the Gujjar and Bakarwal Scheduled Tribes, were killed in custody.

The report draws on documents from the Army’s court of inquiry, WhatsApp chats, and filings before the Armed Forces Tribunal. According to the report, two senior officers (one a Major General and another a Lieutenant General) oversaw the operation, received real-time updates, and even viewed videos of the torture as it was unfolding. One of the officers is heard asking whether any of the tortured men had been identified, while the other continued issuing orders after being informed of deaths in custody.

Despite clear evidence of command responsibility, both the officers remain in powerful positions and were never summoned by the inquiry. The Army has taken mild disciplinary action against some junior officers but no criminal charges have been filed. The inquiry noted that most of the victims had no links to militancy and confirmed the use of extreme violence, but referred to torture as a ‘methodology of questioning’ and described the deaths as the men being ‘found dead.’

Civilian accountability has been equally absent. Police filed only one FIR, which named no accused and omits all reference to the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act despite the victims’ tribal status.

Some families were reportedly offered meagre monetary compensation along with land grants or jobs, but survivors remain permanently injured or displaced. Many told The Caravan they had lost all faith in the Army and the justice system.

The Indian government had used emergency powers to order the takedown of The Caravan’s earlier article on the case. The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) has remained active in the region since 1990, and effectively shields army personnel from criminal prosecution without the permission of the central government. This has never been granted.

News reports revealed that five years after the February 2020 North-East Delhi anti-Muslim riots, only 20 convictions have been secured across 757 First Information Reports (FIRs) related to the violence, which left 53 dead—two-thirds of them Muslim—and hundreds injured. Out of 109 cases where court verdicts have been delivered, 90 (82%) ended in acquittals.

Across these cases, courts frequently flagged serious investigative lapses: 57% of acquittals involved hostile witnesses; many cited delayed or unreliable identifications; others noted contradictions in police testimonies, lack of forensic evidence, and procedural failures. In at least 16 cases, charges were dismissed outright due to lack of prima facie evidence. Multiple judgments expressed concern over the quality of evidence provided by the police.

Parallelly, survivors have received little to no compensation. A new report by Karwan-e-Mohabbat revealed that beyond nominal ex gratia and death relief, no meaningful reparations were provided in the five years since the violence. Despite Muslims accounting for over 95% of reported damage claims, 81% of which pertained to property loss, no disbursements were made for injuries or material destruction. The state-appointed Claims Commission processed evaluations but failed to release any funds, while survivors remained uninformed, received no receipts for claims, and were excluded from public hearings. The Delhi Police’s broader conspiracy case against anti-CAA protest leaders remains ongoing, with 12 Muslims still imprisoned under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), without trial. Meanwhile, BJP leaders accused of inciting violence have not yet faced prosecution. A February 2025 court ruling to register an FIR against Kapil Mishra, a BJP leader accused of inciting and participating in the violence, was stayed upon the request of Delhi Police.

On 11 February, the Supreme Court dismissed a public interest litigation (PIL) petition seeking intervention against incidents of mob lynching by cow vigilantes. The petition, filed by the National Federation of Indian Women, urged the Court to oversee enforcement of its own 2018 anti-lynching guidelines, which continue to be flouted across states.

The bench, however, said it could not ‘micromanage’ such issues, and urged the petitioners to approach state High Courts. The Court also refused to examine the validity of cow protection laws enacted in states, stating that such challenges must be brought before the respective High Courts.

The petitioners had argued that state governments were empowering vigilante groups to exercise police powers, and that authorities routinely failed to file cases against perpetrators. The Court responded that criminal acts must be prosecuted by state governments and declined to intervene in individual incidents. The Court also declined to set uniform compensation standards for lynching victims, stating that such decisions must be made on a case-by-case basis.


The cases highlighted above indicate deep structural obstacles in the delivery of justice for serious human rights violations. Whether due to legal immunity, flawed and biased investigations, procedural delays, or limited judicial intervention, the ability of victims to obtain truth, accountability, and redress remains severely constrained, particularly for Muslims.

In addition to the human rights violations against religious minorities highlighted in previous sections, the Indian government also continued its targeting of journalists, human rights defenders, and civil society organisations. Key developments during the period under review, in chronological order, included:

  • On 3 January 2025, journalist Mukesh Chandrakar was found murdered in Chhattisgarh state. Chandrakar, who ran a popular YouTube channel, frequently reported on corruption, tribal rights and insurgent violence in the conflict-hit Bastar region. The key suspect in the murder was arrested a few days later.
  • On 3 January 2025 , the National Investigation Agency (NIA) arrested Bachha Singh, a well known trade union activist in Jharkhand. Locals alleged that Singh is being targeted for his role in organising contract workers at coal mines in the state.
  • On 6 January 2025, a special NIA court directed the Union Home Ministry to investigate the funding and objectives of several Indian and international NGOs provided legal aid to Muslims accused of involvement in terror-related cases. The court suggested this ‘trend’ promotes a ‘dangerous mindset’.
  • On 8 January 2025, a court in Bengaluru granted bail to a man accused in the murder of journalist Gauri Lankesh. Lankesh was murdered in September 2017. Citing delay in the progress of trial, local courts have now granted bail to all 17 individuals  who had been accused of involvement in the murder.
  • On 27 January 2025, Delhi Police (which is under the control of the central government) filed a first information report (FIR) against journalist Rana Ayyub, for allegedly insulting Hindu deities and spreading ‘anti-India sentiment’, based on a complaint filed by a journalist.
  • On 28 January 2025, Reporters’ Collective, a non-profit news organisation and collective of investigative journalists, claimed that the central Income Tax department had cancelled its non-profit status. In 2024, the Collective had published a series of reports on corruption involving the BJP and its corporate donors.
  • On 19 February 2025, the Jammu & Kashmir High Court quashed a detention order against Kashmiri journalist Majid Hyderi. Hyderi had been detained under the Public Safety Act (PSA), which allows for extended preventive detention without trial. Hyderi is reported to have been released from custody, but re-arrests of those previously detained under PSA is frequent in Kashmir.
  • On 25 February 2025, the central Enforcement Directorate arrested journalist Mahesh Langa under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act. Langa has been incarcerated since October 2024, when he was arrested in Gujarat (a BJP-ruled state) for his alleged involvement in a tax evasion scam. At least seven criminal cases have been filed against him. A court has granted the ED custody over Langa till February 28. Langa has secured bail in some cases, but is likely to remain incarcerated indefinitely following the invocation of PMLA charges.
  • Throughout February and March, the Allahabad High Court continued to hear arguments regarding a petition filed by Mohammad Zubair, a prominent journalist and fact-checker against whom police had registered an FIR in September 2024, reportedly invoking sedition provisions. Zubair had posted a video of a speech by controversial Hindu monk Yati Narsinghanand who had called on his followers to burn effigies of Islam’s Prophet Mohammad. The HC has reportedly issued a stay on Zubair’s arrest. Zubair had previously been arrested in 2022 after he similarly highlighted anti-Islam remarks made by a BJP spokesperson.
  • On 5 March 2025, the Maharashtra state government announced the formation of a Media Monitoring Centre to track and analyse news coverage across print, digital, and social media. The centre will use AI to monitor and classify news items and report on ‘misleading’ content, raising concerns over surveillance and censorship.
  • On 8 March 2025, journalist Raghvendra Bajpai was shot dead in Sitapur (Uttar Pradesh). His family suspects the killing was linked to his reporting on irregularities in the implementation of local government schemes.
  • On 18 March, the Enforcement Directorate (ED) raided eight Bengaluru premises linked to Open Society Foundations, an international grant-making network known for supporting human rights advocacy, alleging violations of foreign exchange laws.