Overview of human rights abuses and violations against India’s religious minorities from 1 April to 30 June, 2025.
Key Figures (april – June, 2025)
STATE ACTORS
- Seven extrajudicial killings of Muslims by police and security forces
- 50+ Adivasis killed in deadliest anti-Maoist operations in years
- 5000+ instances of arbitrary arrest/detention of Muslims
- 2000+ Bengali-speaking Muslims arbitrarily deported; 40+ Rohingya refugees forcibly deported at sea.
- Hundreds of punitive demolitions/evictions targeting Muslims, in defiance of Supreme Court orders
NON-STATE ACTORS
- 11 Muslims killed in incidents involving mob violence or vigilante attacks by Hindu extremist non-state actors
- 100+ Muslims (including 30+ Kashmiris) assaulted in other communally-motivated hate crimes by Hindu extremists
In the second quarter of 2025, India’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi marked the completion of its eleventh year in power. Contrary to expectations following the BJP’s diminished performance in the 2024 General Election, the systematic targeting of religious minorities—particularly Muslims—only grew more entrenched, sustained by the dangerous convergence of law, policy, political rhetoric, and societal hostility. In the weeks following the deadly militant attack on Hindu tourists in Pahalgam in Indian-administered Kashmir in April, India’s Hindu nationalist-dominated state apparatus responded not with restraint, but with sweeping reprisals that disproportionately targeted Kashmiris and deepened the climate of hatred against Muslims more broadly. Across multiple domains of public life, the BJP’s targeting and discriminatory treatment of Muslims intensified, perpetuating patterns of repression and exclusion that increasingly appear to be driven by state policy. Anti-Christian abuse also continues to be reported from various pockets, alongside a broader deterioration of fundamental freedoms nationwide. As India marked 50 years since the Emergency, when civil liberties were suspended for 21 months, observers are drawing comparisons between that era and the present under BJP rule, marked by centralisation of power, democratic backsliding, and rapidly shrinking civic space. India now appears to be well in the throes of what many are calling ‘undeclared Emergency’.
A brief overview of key episodes of anti-minority violence and targeting between 1 April and 30 June, 2025:
- At least seven Muslims were killed in incidents involving police and security forces, across four states. These included three custodial deaths in Kashmir amid a sweeping crackdown following the Pahalgam attack; an allegedly staged ‘encounter’ killing, as well as a death by suicide after alleged police torture in Uttar Pradesh; and further custodial deaths in Delhi and West Bengal. (Deprivation of Life – State Actors)
At least 11 more Muslims were killed in incidents involving mob violence or vigilante attacks by Hindu extremist non-state actors, across eight states. These included fatal mob lynchings in Karnataka, Jharkhand, and Bihar; other fatal attacks in Haryana, Maharashtra, and Madhya Pradesh; and deaths linked to cow protection vigilantism in Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh. (Deprivation of Life – Non-State Actors)
In the central Indian state of Chhattisgarh, security forces shot dead at least 50 people—almost all Adivasis—as part of the government’s final push to ‘wipe out’ the Naxalite armed insurgency. Families alleged that many were tortured and summarily executed.
- Religious strife and mass violence against Muslims were reported in five states across the country (Assam, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, Uttarakhand, and West Bengal), against the backdrop of Hindu religious festivals and other localised triggers. Recurring patterns included the playing or chanting of inflammatory (and often violent) slogans and speeches by Hindu processionists; the subsequent vandalism of Muslim residences, businesses, and places of worship; and the tendency of state authorities in BJP-governed states to subject Muslims to reprisals, including via indiscriminate mass arrests. (Torture and Ill-Treatment: Non-State Actors) (Arrests and Detentions)
- The Pahalgam attack and subsequent military conflict with Pakistan provided the pretext for authorities across the country to arbitrarily detain and arrest thousands of Muslims—including civilians in Kashmir, as well as academics, activists, and migrant workers elsewhere in the country. Over 2,000 Bengali-speaking Muslims were rounded up from across India—and in Gujarat and Assam, their settlements were summarily demolished—before being forcibly deported to Bangladesh without due process, under a new ‘pushback’ policy.
This was also the context in which over 40 Rohingya refugees from Myanmar were detained in Delhi and forcibly deported—left at sea—prompting the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar to launch an inquiry into what he described as ‘unconscionable, unacceptable acts’. (Arbitrary Deportation and Refoulement)
- The Pahalgam attack also triggered a fresh surge in hate speech and incitement against Muslims, driven by senior BJP leaders, Hindu extremist groups, and religious figures operating with impunity. Pro-government television channels aired calls for ‘revenge’ and a ‘final solution’ in Kashmir, while calls for ‘massacres’ and sexual violence against Muslims spread widely on social media. Dozens of religiously motivated hate crimes targeting Kashmiris and other Muslims were reported across the country. Authorities continued to ignore earlier Supreme Court directives to curb hate speech.. (Advocacy of Religious Hatred)
- A mass voter verification drive in Bihar ahead of state elections scheduled for November 2025, triggered alarm over politically targeted disenfranchisement and denationalisation—particularly of Muslims—and raised fears of similar moves in other states. (Disenfranchisement & Denationalisation)
- At the policy level, India’s Parliament introduced sweeping legislative changes that could undermine the autonomy of Muslim religious and charitable endowments across the country and pave the way for the state takeover of property owned and used by Muslim communities for centuries. Alongside, BJP-ruled state governments continued to carry out punitive demolitions and evictions targeting Muslims and their property, in violation of Supreme Court directives mandating due process. BJP states also continued to openly discriminate against Muslims in access to education and livelihoods, while intensifying efforts to culturally marginalise them. The conditions for religious freedom remained dire, especially in states where anti-conversion laws are systematically weaponised against Muslims and Christians. The targeting of Muslims, both by state and non-state actors, also continued to be fuelled by cow protection laws that are now in place in 20 of India’s states, with many now having provisions that empower violent ‘vigilante’ groups to function in a quasi-official manner and assist with enforcement, with impunity. (Discrimination in Access to Economic, Social & Cultural Rights) (Religious Freedom)
- Alongside, Indian authorities have also intensified their targeting of journalists and independent media, civil society organisations, academics, artists, performers, and other political dissenters, while pro-government news outlets broadcast an unprecedented barrage of disinformation, with wide-ranging regional implications. (Shrinking Civic Space & Democratic Backsliding)
- Given the severity of the problem, international experts have raised the alarm about the situation in India. In recent months, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), in separate letters to the Indian government, raised concerns about discrimination against Bengali-speaking Muslims in Assam and about the forced displacement and evictions of Adivasis across India. The UN Special Procedures mandate-holders on adequate housing, minority issues, and freedom of religion or belief issued a joint press statement calling on India to halt arbitrary and punitive demolitions targeting low-income households, minorities, and migrants.
- The normalisation of anti-minority abuse and discrimination, and a severely shrunk civic space, are direct consequences of institutional decay, with India’s domestic mechanisms failing to ensure effective remedy, protection of rights and freedoms, and accountability for abuses. International and domestic experts continue to call these out. India’s National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) faced an unprecedented downgrade by GANHRI over its lack of independence and failure to respond to systemic human rights violations. REDRESS published a new report detailing how India’s police and security forces have normalised the use of torture and ill-treatment as a routine tool of law enforcement. And a report by a domestic civil society coalition highlighted how systemic weaknesses across India’s police, judiciary, prisons and legal aid system disproportionately impact Muslims, Dalits, Adivasis, women, and rural communities. (Lack of Effective Remedy)
During the period under review, India’s police and other security forces were implicated in a series of alleged abuses raising grave concerns under the right to life. In Uttar Pradesh, one Muslim man was shot dead in an alleged ‘encounter’, while another died by suicide following alleged police torture. Further custodial deaths were reported from Delhi and West Bengal. And least 50 people—almost all Adivasis—were killed in major anti-Maoist operations across Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh, with multiple families alleging custodial torture and staged ‘encounters’. In Kashmir, three Muslims were reportedly killed in separate incidents involving the police and military amid a sweeping crackdown in the aftermath of the Pahalgam terror attack.
The cases highlighted above raise serious concerns under international human rights law, particularly with respect to the right to life, the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment, and the state’s duty to ensure effective investigation and accountability. The failure to uphold these obligations, particularly in cases involving Muslims and Adivasis, serves as further evidence of their discriminatory treatment by state authorities, as well as of the apparent impunity enjoyed by alleged perpetrators.
In the first quarter of 2025, we had documented the killings of at least six Muslim civilians in incidents involving police and security forces, across four states. See the 2025/Q1 edition of IPT here.
During the period under review, at least 11 Muslim men were killed in incidents involving religiously-motivated assault and mob violence by non-state actors, across 8 states. These including mob lynchings in Karnataka, Jharkhand, and Bihar; other fatal attacks in Haryana, Maharashtra, and Madhya Pradesh; and vigilante violence linked to cow protection in Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh. Several killings occurred in the context of alleged religious abuse, or involved the targeting of visible markers of Muslim identity. In multiple cases, the attackers filmed or threatened to circulate videos of the attacks.
The cases highlighted above raise serious concerns under international human rights law, particularly relating to the state’s duty to prevent, investigate, and provide effective remedy for violations by non-state actors. In several cases, police disputed eyewitness accounts, denied religious motives, and reportedly shielded perpetrators. These continuing failures reflect a broader pattern of impunity in cases of mob violence targeting Muslims.
In the first quarter of 2025, we had documented the killings of five Muslims in incidents involving mob violence or vigilante attacks by Hindu extremist non-state actors, across five states. See the 2025/Q1 edition of IPT here.
In the second quarter of 2025, India witnessed a sharp escalation in arbitrary arrests and detentions of Muslims, mainly in the context of the Pahalgam attack, but also under state-level cow protection laws.
The cases highlighted above raise serious concerns under international human rights law relating to the prohibition of arbitrary detention and the rights to liberty, equality before the law, and due process. Many of the arrests described above were carried out without credible legal basis, in a discriminatory manner, or in reprisal for the peaceful exercise of protected rights. These patterns are exacerbated by routine violations of procedural safeguards, including prolonged pre-trial detention, denial of legal representation, and the use of intimidation and public humiliation.
During the period under review, police officials were implicated in multiple incidents of torture, custodial abuse, and public humiliation targeting Muslims. This included a potential revival of staged ‘half encounter’ shootings in Uttar Pradesh, and reports of physical assault and degrading public parades elsewhere.
The recently-reported cases highlighted above are only illustrative. Torture and ill-treatment remain endemic across India, routinely used by authorities as a tool of law enforcement. For Muslims in particular, such violence is often shaped by discriminatory religious motives. While India is a signatory to the UN Convention Against Torture, it has yet to ratify the treaty or enact a standalone domestic law criminalising torture, contributing to persistent accountability gaps.
A recent report by REDRESS highlighted this normalisation of custodial torture in India and the lack of effective safeguards for victims. Complementing these findings, a May 2025 report by SAJC documented recurring patterns of custodial violence specifically targeting Muslims. The report found that Muslim detainees were routinely subjected not only to severe physical abuse, but also to degrading treatment that explicitly targeted their religious identity, including being forced to chant Hindu religious slogans or mocked for religious identity-markers and practices.
In the second quarter of 2025, episodes of religiously motivated mass were reported from five states. In the aftermath of these episodes, authorities in BJP-governed states continued to selectively and arbitrarily punish Muslims. And throughout the period under review, Muslims and Christians continued to be violently targeted on various other pretexts in religiously motivated hate crimes.
The cases documented above raise serious concerns under international human rights law, particularly in relation to the rights to security of person, protection from torture and ill-treatment, and religious freedom. They act as further evidence of Indian authorities’ failure to meet their obligation to prevent, investigate, and provide remedy for violations perpetrated by non-state actors. In many cases, perpetrators operate with clear political or institutional protection, while victims faced police inaction, harassment, or even retaliatory charges, further entrenching a climate of impunity as well as eroding public trust in the domestic justice system.
In the weeks following the 22 April atrocities against tourists in Pahalgam, authorities across India intensified a campaign of mass detentions and cross-border deportations of alleged foreigners. These actions—targeting Bengali-speaking Muslims accused of being undocumented migrants, as well as Rohingya Muslim refugees from Myanmar—have raised serious concerns over arbitrary detention and deportation as well as violations of international legal protections against refoulement.
These developments—whether the targeting of Bengali-speaking Muslims within India or Rohingya refugees from Myanmar—reflect a dangerous violation of legal protections against arbitrary expulsion, and a growing disregard for India’s obligations under international human rights law. The absence of transparent procedures, case-by-case assessments or access to legal counsel raise serious concerns about violations of the right to liberty and security of person, protection from arbitrary detention, and due process guarantees under the ICCPR, to which India is a party.
Further, while India is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, the deportation of Rohingya refugees—despite the well-documented risks of persecution and ill-treatment upon return—constitutes a clear violation of the principle of non-refoulement, a binding norm of customary international law that prohibits returning individuals to a real risk of torture or other serious human rights violations.
- In the aftermath of the militant attack against Hindus on 22 April in Pahalgam, Jammu & Kashmir, Hindu nationalists weaponised grief and anger, and launched a coordinated, nationwide hate campaign targeting Muslims. Between 22 April and 2 May, India Hate Lab (IHL) documented 64 in-person hate speech eventsacross 10 states (including the Union Territory of J&K), with Maharashtra (17), Uttar Pradesh (13), and Uttarakhand (6) reporting the highest incidence.
- Organised by BJP and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS, the Hindu nationalist network of which the BJP is the political wing)-allied outfits like the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and Bajrang Dal, these rallies featured repeated incitement to violence and calls for economic boycott. Muslims were referred to as ‘mad dogs,’ ‘insects/worms,’ ‘piglets,’ and ‘green snakes,’ among other dehumanising pejorative references. This wave of hate speech was accompanied by a parallel spike in anti-Muslim hate crimes. IHL also noted that most rallies were livestreamed or amplified via social media platforms, further fuelling offline violence.
- Notable during the post-Pahalgam spike in anti-Muslim hate speech were:
- The administration of a public oath by BJP Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) Nandkishore Gurjar in Ghaziabad (Uttar Pradesh) on 26 April, where he urged attendees to identify and expel all those who ‘support Pakistan,’ and used religious slurs such as ‘topiwallas,’ ‘jihadis,’ and ‘Rohingya Bangladeshis.’
- A speech by BJP cabinet minister Kunwar Vijay Shah in Madhya Pradesh on 15 May, where he described Colonel Sofia Qureshi—a Muslim Army officer who had led India’s press briefings during the India–Pakistan conflict—as the ‘sister of terrorists,’ and claimed that she was sent by PM Modi to ‘take revenge’ for the Pahalgam killings. The Madhya Pradesh High Court initiated suo motu proceedings, calling the statement ‘dangerous’ and ordering the registration of an FIR. Shah was not arrested.
- A violent threat issued on 30 April by BJP leader Krishna Ghadge against Congress MLA Arif Masood, a Muslim, during a rally in Bhopal (Madhya Pradesh). Ghadge referred to Masood as a ‘Pakistani agent,’ declared ‘we will not spare them,’ and invoked the Pahalgam attack to justify his threat. At the time of writing, there was no indication of an FIR being registered.
- Comments by BJP MP Ram Chander Jangra in Haryana on 25 May, where he blamed the victims and survivors of the Pahalgam terror attack for their own fate. Referring to the widows of those killed as lacking ‘spirit and vigour,’ he claimed they should have fought back ‘like veeranganas (warrior women),’ and suggested the deaths could have been avoided had the tourists undergone military-style training. Despite widespread outrage, no disciplinary action was reported against Jangra.
- A wave of violent, often genocidal rhetoric across mainstream television channels, targeted at Kashmiris in particular and Muslims more broadly. On Republic News, popular anchor Arnab Goswami described the Pahalgam killings as ‘to India what October 7 was to Israel,’ aired slogans such as ‘#WeWantRevenge,’ and demanded a ‘final solution’ in Kashmir, echoing Holocaust-era exterminationist rhetoric. Such communal framing dominated mainstream media coverage, eclipsing accounts of Kashmiri Muslims who had aided Hindu tourists and deflecting scrutiny from security failures. (Also see the section on Shrinking Civic Space and Democratic Backsliding for more on how the Indian media propagated misinformation during the India-Pakistan military conflict.)
- An eruption of violent anti-Muslim hate speech on social media, particularly from Hindu nationalist accounts. X spaces and pages openly called for the ‘massacre of Muslims,’ promoting conspiracy theories accusing ‘every Kashmiri of complicity’, and using slurs and threats such as ‘cut their heads and hang their bodies in Lal Chowk.’ As with mainstream media, slogans like ‘final solution’ and calls for ‘Israel-style’ retaliation were widespread. BJP-linked pages, including at least one official state unit’s page, amplified such communal propaganda.
- This wave of hate also included explicit incitement to sexual violence, with Hindu nationalist accounts using the occasion to target Kashmiri Muslim women, and threats of rape circulating openly on X. One widely shared post by an anonymous Hindu nationalist, initially framed as a message of support for ‘threatened Kashmiri girls,’ devolved into rape threats and other violent fantasies. These were not isolated comments but part of a broader trend of Islamophobic hate, targeting Muslim women as objects of conquest and humiliation. Arfa Khanum Sherwani, a senior Muslim journalist who had called for peace and de-escalation during the India-Pakistan military conflict, was doxxed by Hindu nationalist accounts and bombarded with rape threats, Islamophobic slurs and other graphic abuse. No meaningful legal action was reported against any of the perpetrators.
- The online harassment of Himanshi Narwal, the widow of a naval officer who had been killed in the Pahalgam attack. An image of a distraught Narwal at the attack site had become a widely circulated symbol of grief, but she faced Hindu nationalists’ ire after she publicly urged peace and cautioned against anti-Muslim and anti-Kashmiri sentiment. She was branded an ‘anti-national,’ her past social media interactions with Muslim friends scrutinised, and subjected to a barrage of misogynistic abuse and threats. No action is known to have been taken against Narwal’s online abusers.
- The proliferation of anti-Muslim hate at India’s elite academic institutions: at Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Gandhinagar, a coordinated disinformation campaign falsely blamed Muslim students and faculty of running an Islamic indoctrination project, resulting in death threats. At Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS) Mumbai, Islamophobic slurs were shared in official WhatsApp groups, including one with senior faculty. At West Bengal’s Bidhan Chandra Krishi Viswavidyalaya, a poster reading ‘Dogs and Muslims not allowed’ appeared on a university notice board.
- The administration of a public oath by BJP Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) Nandkishore Gurjar in Ghaziabad (Uttar Pradesh) on 26 April, where he urged attendees to identify and expel all those who ‘support Pakistan,’ and used religious slurs such as ‘topiwallas,’ ‘jihadis,’ and ‘Rohingya Bangladeshis.’
- Also during the period under review (Q2 2025), the same trends highlighted by India Hate Lab in its 2024 annual report continued unabated, as India witnessed escalated levels of ‘top’ and ‘intermediate’ level hate speech targeted at religious minorities, particularly Muslims. (‘Top’ level hate speech is prohibited by international law, constituting direct incitement to hostility, discrimination, or violence; ‘Intermediate’ level hate speech may be prohibited by states—and are prohibited by India—to protect the rights or reputations of others, or for the protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or morals. See UN guidance here.)
- During the second quarter of 2025, Prime Minister Narendra Modi continued to play a central role in mainstreaming and legitimising anti-Muslim and other racist rhetoric.
At a public rally in Haryana on 14 April, in his first public remarks on the controversial Waqf Amendment Act passed earlier that month (see section on Religious Freedom), Modi invoked a long-standing anti-Muslim slur, suggesting that Muslim youth had been condemned by previous governments to lives fixing ‘punctures’ in tyres. The remark recycled language Modi himself has previously used, and is a common dog-whistle used by Hindu nationalists to stereotype India’s Muslims as poor, illiterate, and menial. Modi’s speech went further, accusing the opposition Congress Party of looting land from Dalits and Adivais, and of turning them into ‘second class citizens’ while appeasing Muslims.
In a separate speech in Gujarat in May, Modi called for a boycott of Ganesha idols with ‘small eyes,’ in a jibe ostensibly directed at Chinese imports. The phrasing mirrored racist slurs frequently used against people from India’s north-eastern states.
In the aftermath of India’s 2024 General Election—when Modi had made multiple speeches referring to India’s Muslims as ‘infiltrators’ and ‘those with more children,’ among other pejoratives—three UN Special Procedures mandate-holders had found that election-time speeches by PM Modi and other senior BJP leaders appeared to prima facie meet the threshold of religious hatred constituting internationally prohibited hate speech. The Indian government is yet to respond to that allegation letter.
- Chief Ministers (CMs) of many BJP-governed states, including those where the largest numbers of India’s Muslims reside, continued to keep their crosshairs fixed on Muslims, targeting them via hateful rhetoric as well as discriminatory policies and actions.
Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath issued a warning to Muslims to desist from offering prayers on streets, asking them to learn from the ‘religious discipline’ shown by Hindus during the recently-completed Kumbh Mela. (A stampede during the Mela had resulted in the deaths of dozens of pilgrims. A BBC investigation in June revealed that the UP government had falsified the official death toll at 37 and secretly paid compensation to several more families, confirming at least 82 deaths.) In Q1 2025, Adityanath had referred to Muslims using a religious slur, and denigrated Urdu, a language closely associated with Indian Muslim identity, as a language of fanatics.
Also in UP, Deputy CM Brajesh Pathak attended an event organised by Vishwa Hindu Raksha Parishad (VHRP) that called for India to be declared a Hindu Rashtra (Nation), and remarked that he would work ‘shoulder to shoulder’ for the VHRP’s causes.
Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma accused Muslims of ‘weaponising beef’ and throwing beef waste and leftovers to drive away Hindus, and also accused the opposition of lacking the courage to speak out against qurbani (animal sacrifice ritual during Eid). In Q2 2025, Sarma also continued his long-standing campaign against Bengali-speaking Muslims, celebrated India’s recent ‘pushback policy’, announced plans to provide ‘indigenous’ people along border areas with arms licenses (see section on Arbitrary Deportation and Refoulement), and ordered mass arrests of Muslims amid the India-Pakistan conflict, calling them ‘anti-nationals’ and ‘foreign agents’ (see section on Arrests and Detentions).
- Other senior BJP leaders, including elected parliamentarians, state ministers and state-level legislators, continued to make public remarks targeting Muslims:
| Name | Description |
| Nishikant Dubey (BJP MP, Jharkhand) | Dubey, a four-time elected MP in the national Parliament, launched a tirade against former Chief Election Commissioner SY Quraishi. In response to Quraishi’s criticism of the Waqf Amendment Act, Dubey accused him of being a ‘Muslim Commissioner’ and facilitating the addition of ‘Bangladeshi infiltrators’ to electoral rolls. Separately, Dubey attacked India’s Supreme Court—which had stayed the implementation of some provisions in the Waqf Amendment Act—and blamed India’s Chief Justice for ‘all the civil wars happening in this country.’ |
| Nitesh Rane (Cabinet Minister, Maharashtra) | Rane, a prolific hate speech offender who was promoted as a Cabinet Minister following the BJP’s state election victory in Maharashtra last year, continued to make anti-Muslim speeches throughout Q2 2025. At a public event in Ratnagiri on 25 April, Rane referred to India’s Muslims as ‘green snakes’ and appeared to incite violence, further stating, ‘I know who needs an injection and who needs to be shot.’ At other speeches, Rane continued to refer to Muslims as ‘jihadis’ and propagate unfounded anti-Muslim conspiracy theories. In Q1 2025, a Muslim businessman in Sidhuburgh district had alleged that his home and shops were illegally demolished by local authorities after receiving direct orders from Rane. |
| T. Raja Singh (BJP MLA, Telangana) | Singh, a prolific hate speech offender who was fielded as a BJP candidate in last year’s assembly elections despite previously being suspended from the party for anti-Muslim hate speech, continued to lead anti-Muslim hate rallies and processions throughout Q2 2025. At a Ram Navami rally in Hyderabad in early April, Singh was reported to have remarked, ‘We don’t need Hindus who pray to God. We need Hindus who kill terrorists, love jihadis, and those who do religious conversions.’ In July, Singh claimed to have resigned from his membership in the party, apparently in opposition to the party’s newly-chosen state unit president. |
| Nand Kishore Gurjar (BJP MLA, Uttar Pradesh) | Gurjar, a BJP MLA from Loni in Ghaziabad district, threatened Muslim meat sellers ahead of Eid al-Adha in June. In a widely circulated video, Gurjar was seen abusing shopkeepers during a visit to local meat markets, accompanied by police, and declaring, “If he runs away, shoot him.” Earlier, Gurjar had written to the police demanding a ban on meat sale and slaughter during Eid, bizarrely claiming that the practices were endangering Air Force operations. In April, as noted earlier, Gurjar had administered a public oath calling on attendees to find and expel all those who ‘support Pakistan,’ and used religious slurs such as ‘topiwallas,’ ‘jihadis,’ and ‘Rohingya Bangladeshis’ in reference to Muslims. |
| Gopichand Padalkar (BJP MLA, Karnataka) | At a public event on 28 April following the Pahalgam attack, BJP MLA Padalkar claimed that ‘all terrorists are Muslims,’ alleged that Hindus were under threat, and invoked the unfounded ‘land jihad’ and ‘love jihad’ conspiracy theories. |
| Basangouda Patil Yatnal (BJP MLA, Karnataka) | At a Ram Navami event on 6 April, BJP MLA Yatnal falsely claimed that Waqf properties rightfully belong to Hindu temples, misquoted Ambedkar to suggest that all Muslims should have left India at Partition, and called for a ‘Yogi Adityanath-like’ Chief Minister in Karnataka to act against ‘anti-nationals.’ |
- In the aftermath of a major anti-Maoist operation in Chhattisgarh by India’s security forces (see section on Deprivation of Life: State Actors), the official X (formerly Twitter) handle of the BJP’s Karnataka unit posted an AI-generated image of Union Home Minister Amit Shah holding a cauliflower over a gravestone marked ‘Naxalism: Rest in Peace’.
Analysts noted the implications of the cauliflower imagery, a reference to the 1989 Bhagalpur anti-Muslim pogrom, in which 900 Muslims were killed, including over 100 whose bodies were secretly buried in a field and covered with cauliflower saplings. In recent years, the symbol of the cauliflower has been appropriated by Hindu nationalist online accounts as a dog-whistle for anti-Muslim mass violence, circumventing hate speech restrictions. The BJP’s official post marked a disturbing mainstreaming of violent Hindu extremist iconography.
- The Ram Navami Hindu festival, in early April, provided the pretext for a fresh wave of hate rallies and armed processions across India, many of them explicitly targeting Muslims via inflammatory slogans, music, and imagery. For instance, in Mumbai, participants in an armed procession were reported chanting violent and obscene anti-Muslim slogans under heavy police presence and drone surveillance, without any subsequent action being taken against them. In West Bengal, RSS and VHP units were reported to have organised armed processions through communally sensitive areas, as local cadres of the BJP invoked violent rhetoric and deliberately inflamed tensions in multiple districts. The ruling Trinamool Congress (TMC), instead of curbing these provocations, responded with its own processions, further legitimising the spectacle.
Analysts have noted that Ram Navami, among other Hindu festivals, is increasingly becoming more of a vehicle for Hindu extremist mobilisation and normalisation of anti-Muslim hate and violence, and less of a religious observance.
- Kerala, a southern state where the BJP is yet to attain significant electoral influence, witnessed an unprecedented surge in anti-Muslim rhetoric by senior Hindu nationalist figures and sympathisers.
PC George, a senior BJP leader who was briefly arrested and remanded during Q1 2025 for referring to Muslims as terrorists and propounding the unfounded love jihad conspiracy theory, accused India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of being a Muslim who secretly performed Islamic prayers. No further police action was reported.
Vellappally Natesan, general secretary of the influential SNDP Yogam, stoked communal tensions by describing the Muslim-majority district of Malappuram as a place where Ezhavas (a once-marginalised but now politically influential Hindu caste group) ‘cannot breathe freely’. Natesan’s comments were defended by Kerala CM Pinarayi Vijayan as a reference specifically to the Indian Union Muslim League political party, and not to Muslims as a whole.
In a social media post, K.R. Indira, a producer employed by the state-owned All India Radio, called on Hindus to ‘take up arms’ against Muslims protesting the Waqf Amendment Act, and urged them to ‘hack fiercely’. No disciplinary or police action was reported against Indira. Also notable were reports of arms training camps being organised by RSS-affiliates at a prominent Christian-managed college in Thiruvananthapuram, and reports of secret meetings among RSS sympathisers within Kerala’s prison and police departments.
- Baba Ramdev, a yoga guru and founder of the Patanjali consumer goods conglomerate, launched a television and social media advertising campaign deploying Islamophobic tropes to market his products. In one video, Ramdev urged consumers to reject Rooh Afza—an iconic drink manufactured by the Muslim-owned Hamdard company—claiming that buying it would help build ‘mosques and madrassas’, whereas purchasing Patanjali’s competing drink would fund Hindu institutions. He coined the term ‘sharbat jihad’ to describe this unfounded threat. After the Delhi High Court condemned the campaign as ‘indefensible’ and ‘shocking,’ Ramdev agreed to withdraw the ads. No further action is known to have been initiated against Ramdev or Patanjali.
- Repeat hate speech offenders, at all levels, continued to evade accountability. In early April, a court order to finally register an FIR against Kapil Mishra, the newly-appointed Cabinet Minister in Delhi who had popularised the ‘shoot the traitors’ slogan against Muslims in 2019-20, was stayed upon the request of Delhi Police. And the Indian Supreme Court’s directives in 2023 to all state governments to take suo motuaction in hate speech cases remained unheeded across the country.
During the period under review, the BJP-led central government introduced sweeping legislative changes that could undermine the autonomy of Muslim religious endowments across India. In parallel, BJP-governed states escalated restrictions on minorities’ religious practices and structures. These included the continued abuse of anti-conversion laws, fresh curbs on religious observance around key Islamic festivals, and selective demolitions of Muslim religious structures.
The developments highlighted above raise serious concerns under international human rights law as well as domestic constitutional guarantees relating to religious freedom. The right to adopt, change, and manifest one’s religion, including the freedom to worship in public, is a core human right that is to be protected without discrimination or coercion. The measures outlined above appear to unduly limit this freedom.
During the period under review, a mass voter verification drive in Bihar ahead of state elections scheduled for November 2025, triggered alarm over politically targeted disenfranchisement and denationalisation—particularly of Muslims—and raised fears of similar moves in other states.
This development raises serious concerns under international human rights law, which obliges states to ensure the right to political participation without discrimination. The ICCPR guarantees every citizen the right to vote and to be elected in genuine periodic elections, and further prohibits discrimination on the grounds of religion and ethnicity, among others. Mass exclusion of vulnerable groups, particularly Muslims, through opaque and arbitrary administrative processes constitute a clear violation of these obligations.
During the period under review, BJP-ruled governments continued to discriminate against Muslims in access to housing, education, employment and livelihoods, and cultural life. This included punitive demolitions and evictions in defiance of Supreme Court directives; state-wide crackdown on Islamic madrassas in Uttarakhand and on Christian missionary schools in Madhya Pradesh; continuing discrimination and exclusion faced by Muslim children at educational institutions; continuing targeting of Muslim meat and food businesses under the guise of Hindu religious observance; and the intensification of other efforts to culturally marginalise Muslims.
As referred to throughout previous sections, India’s domestic mechanisms continued to largely fail to ensure accountability for ongoing and previous violations. The judicial process continued to be skewed towards powerful Hindu nationalist interests, and against minorities. Victims and families seeking justice were routinely harassed and intimidated. And even when India’s courts, including the Supreme Court, have attempted to step in, a sense of permissiveness and impunity has continued to prevail among State and non-State actors accused of violations. The following is a brief overview of recent reports and developments that underscore this lack of effective remedy.
The following is a brief overview of recent reports and developments that underscore this lack of effective remedy:
The cases highlighted above indicate deep structural obstacles in the delivery of justice for serious human rights violations. Whether due to legal immunity, flawed and biased investigations, procedural delays, or limited judicial intervention, the ability of victims to obtain truth, accountability, and redress remains severely constrained, particularly for Muslims.
In June 2025, India marked 50 years since the imposition of Emergency, a 21-month period during which then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi suspended civil liberties, jailed opposition leaders, and censored the press. While the BJP government sought to commemorate that period as a cautionary tale about authoritarian excess, critics across the political spectrum pointed to striking parallels with India’s present trajectory, which many have described as an ‘undeclared Emergency’ marked by institutional capture, escalating repression, and the normalisation of violence. During the second quarter of 2025, these concerns gained renewed urgency as the Modi government intensified its targeting of journalists and independent media, civil society organisations, and other political dissenters. Notable developments and continuing trends during Q2 2025 included: